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Abstract
Upper echelons theory focuses on executives as a source of heterogeneity in firm’s strategic
actions and performance, as executives’ characteristics (e.g. experience, personality, and values)
inform the decision-making process, influencing how executives see, perceive and understand
environmental stimuli. In recent years, the degree of narcissism CEOs hold has emerged as an
important personality trait that can explain how CEOs influence a variety of firm outcomes.
Nevertheless, there is a plethora of equivocal findings in which narcissistic CEOs are associated
with contrasting outcomes (e.g., positive and negative firm performance, corporate social
responsibility and misconduct). In this three-essay dissertation, I draw from the personality
psychology conceptualization of narcissism as a self-regulatory process model to examine the
underlying mechanisms of the narcissism trait. In the first essay, I reviewed the literature on
CEO narcissism using meta-analytic structural equation modeling to assess the impact of
narcissistic CEOs on firm performance in concert with three mechanisms – self-assuredness,
attention seeking, and top management team characteristics. The findings show that effect of
CEO narcissism on firm performance is much smaller than previously thought, and the
mechanisms have differential effects on firm performance. In the second essay, I theorize and
test contrasting effects of narcissism admiration and narcissism rivalry on firm performance. The
results show that while narcissistic CEOs have a positive effect on firm performance by
displaying narcissism admiration, they have a negative effect when exhibiting narcissism rivalry.
In the third essay, I theorize and test why and when narcissism admiration explains the
narcissistic CEO’s engagement with corporate sociopolitical activism. The findings indicate that
narcissistic CEOs act opportunistically and use corporate sociopolitical activism as an
opportunity to draw wider attention to their actions. Altogether, this dissertation advances upper
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echelons theory by theorizing and showing the importance of examining the processual
mechanisms that can untangle and explain complex personality traits such as narcissism. Without
such a fine-grained analysis, scholars cannot unveil the true relationship between firm outcomes
and narcissistic CEOs.
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Introduction
Upper Echelons theory is rooted in the idea that executives’ cognitive base and values
matter for the strategic content and process because they inform the process of attention,
selection and interpretation of the factors in the decision-making process (Carpenter et al., 2004;
Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007). The empirical work has cemented support for the
upper echelons’ argument. Indeed, in recent meta-analyses, Wang et al. (2017) and Cragun et al.
(2020) found support for the influence of multiple Chief Executive Officer (CEO) attributes (e.g.
age, tenure, education, experience) as well as narcissism on firm strategic outcomes and
performance. Additionally, studies showed the influence of CEOs on performance has increased
over the years; the so-called “CEO effect” is about 12 percent (Quigley & Graffin, 2017; Quigley
& Hambrick, 2015). In the same vein, Wang et al. (2016) found that the single effect size of the
CEO tenure on firm performance was 67 percent as large as the effect size of the entire firm
human capital reported in the meta-analysis performed by Crook et al. (2011).
Narcissism, the degree to which individuals make a continuous effort to achieve and
maintain a grandiose self (Back et al., 2013), has emerged as an important personality trait to
explain how CEOs influence a variety of firm outcomes. Narcissist CEOs, for instance, are more
likely to take on activities that hold greater risk. In a study of German companies, Oesterle et al.
(2016) found that narcissist CEOs are more likely to internationalize than non-narcissist CEOs.
Similarly, Gerstner et al. (2013) found that narcissist CEOs pay more attention to discontinuous
technologies, and further, invest often in those technologies. On the negative side, Rijsenbilt and
Commandeur (2013) found narcissist CEOs are sued more often than non-narcissist CEOs for
corporate fraud by the Security Exchange Commission (SEC).
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While there is a wealth of CEO narcissism literature, there are still several gaps that
remain. The literature in personality psychology shows that narcissism is a multidimensional
construct, and that these dimensions of narcissism have different nomological networks (Back et
al., 2013; Krizan & Herlache, 2018; Miller et al., 2017; Wink, 1991). Despite this
conceptualization, current unobtrusive measures – i.e., Chatterjee and Hambrick’s index,
Petrenko and colleagues’ video metric, or Hart’s signature size metric -- are all unidimensional.
This type of measure is problematic as it hinders the recognition that narcissists can be more
complex across multiple dimensions, and thus evidence paradoxical behaviors. Accordingly,
analyzing CEO narcissism as a unidimensional construct obscures the complex dynamics around
narcissism and its relations with the strategic actions of firms.
Second, several dimensions of narcissistic behavior remain essentially untested, and
given scholars have theorized specific mechanisms of narcissistic behavior such as self-assured
behavior (e.g. overconfidence), these constructs have yet to be empirically validated. This
divergence between theory and empirically testing has led scholars to recognize the necessity for
mediation analysis to improve our understanding of CEO narcissism (Chatterjee & Pollock,
2017). Herein, I offer not only a direct test of both self-assured and attention-seeking behaviors,
but also theorize and test two additional mechanisms (approach motivation and TMT threat
minimization) linking CEO narcissism and strategic actions. Finally, the existing literature has
alluded to the possibility that narcissistic CEOs may be associated with managerial opportunism
through engaging in activities that benefits themselves and harms firm performance (Petrenko et
al., 2016; Rijsenbilt & Commandeur, 2013). By examining corporate sociopolitical activism, I
test such ideas and theorize boundary conditions about when opportunistic behavior is more
likely.
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To advance the upper echelons literature, this three-essay dissertation draws from the
process model of narcissism (Back et al., 2013), to explore how different facets of narcissism
may affect firm outcomes. My research question thus centers around “how do narcissistic
behaviors affect firm’s strategic actions and performance?” Exploring this research question, I
seek to contribute to upper echelons theory by offering a more fine-grained view on CEO
narcissism and the strategic actions and performance link. Understanding those behaviors by
which narcissism translates into firms’ outcomes is critical in order to draw recommendations to
improve business management.
Three Studies
To accomplish these goals, each essay approaches different aspects of the narcissism
trait. In the first paper, I examine the current state of the CEO narcissism literature to assess how
much of the effect of CEO narcissism on firm performance is due to the two mechanisms
described in the literature: self-assured and seeking for attention behaviors. Utilizing a sample of
51 published and six unpublished manuscripts, I used meta-analytic structural equation modeling
to evaluate whether and how self-assured and seeking for attention behaviors mediate the
relationship between narcissism and firm performance. Additionally, I examined exploratorily
whether and how corporate governance mechanisms and top management team characteristics
affect the association between CEO narcissism and firm performance.
In the second paper, I draw directly from personality psychology regarding the
conceptualization of narcissism as a self-regulatory process model to theorize that the different
profiles of narcissism – narcissistic admiration and narcissistic rivalry – have contrasting effects
on firm performance. Specifically, I theorized two new mediators – approach motivation
(narcissistic admiration) and top management team threat minimization (narcissistic rivalry) –
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through which narcissistic CEOs impacts firm performance differently. In sum, narcissistic
admiration positively relates to firm performance, while narcissistic rivalry negatively relates to
firm performance. I tested this mediation model with a sample of 338 unique CEOs and 286
unique S&P 500 firms.
The final essay examines the role of CEO narcissism on corporate sociopolitical activism.
Sociopolitical issues such as same-sex marriage, gun control, and immigration lack a clear
normative or institutional consensus, and evoke a very highly divided debate in which people are
strongly divided either for or against the issue. Most importantly, a public stance by the firm then
has the potential to alienate a larger consumer base (Nalick et al., 2016). Despite this risk, more
and more CEOs have brought their companies directly into social debates, with some scholars
arguing such involvement represents a form of corporate sociopolitical activism (Chatterji &
Toffel, 2018). However, thus far, the role of CEO narcissism has been overlooked as potential
factor in driving this trend. Therefore, in this essay we theorize why and when narcissistic CEOs
are more likely to engage in corporate sociopolitical activism. Specifically, I argue that
narcissistic admiration behaviors and selfishness motivate narcissistic CEOs to exploit the
opportunity to drawn attention to themselves, even if such behavior can represent potential losses
for firm. Additionally, we show that seeking celebrity status and the degree of public opposition
increases the likelihood of narcissistic CEOs to engage in corporate sociopolitical activism.
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Chapter 1: Revisiting The CEO Narcissism-Firm Performance Link: An Assessment With
Meta-Analytic Structural Equation Modeling
Introduction
In the past decade, scholars in upper echelons theory have examined the influence of
chief executive officer (CEO) narcissism as a construct that can affect both firms’ strategic
actions and their performance (Chatterjee & Hamrick, 2007; Gupta & Misangyi, 2018; Ham et
al., 2018). Narcissistic CEOs have been consistently associated with higher risk taking, strategic
dynamism, merger and acquisitions (M&A), misconduct, and corporate social responsibility
(CSR) (Chatterjee & Hamrick, 2007; Gupta & Misangyi, 2018; Oesterle et al., 2016; Petrenko et
al., 2016; Scotter & Roglio, 2018). As a personality trait, narcissism indicates individuals who
have inflated views of themselves, and who seek to have those positive self-views continuously
reinforced (Campbell et al., 2004). In a recent review and meta-analysis of management,
accounting, and finance journals, Cragun et al. (2020) found a positive association between CEO
narcissism and firm performance, across different measures of both constructs. Nonetheless,
product moment correlation offers an incomplete picture of the association between variables
when these variables share variance with the same third variable (Berg et al. 2016). For instance,
if both CEO narcissism and firm performance correlates with variables such as firm size or CEO
age, then the correlation between them is biased.
Furthermore, it is still unclear what mechanisms lead CEO narcissism to affect firm
performance. While some studies have posited CEO narcissism is negatively related to firm
performance because narcissistic CEOs take on too much risk (Ham et al., 2018), other studies
have shown CEO narcissism can be positively associated with firm performance as narcissistic
CEOs proactively engage in strategic changes to overcome problems (Patel & Cooper, 2014;
5

Reina et al., 2014). An alternative line of studies has suggested that CEO narcissism is related
only to firm performance variation because narcissistic CEOs focus on big moves and,
consequently, their success is attached to it (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Wales et al., 2013).
Understanding how CEO narcissism impacts firm performance is essential not only to guide
future research on CEO narcissism, but also to inform the improvement of corporate governance
controls and monitoring activities.
In this study, we therefore revisit the relation between CEO narcissism and firm
performance using meta-analytic structural equation modeling (MASEM) (Berg et al., 2016;
Aguinis et al., 2011; Cheung & Chan, 2005). MASEM allow us to calculate effect sizes while
controlling for other variables, test mediation hypotheses, and compare competing theoretical
models (Bergh et al., 2016). Specifically, we examine the relation between CEO narcissism and
firm performance while accounting for other CEO-, firm-, and corporate governance-related
explanatory variables. In addition, we examine how self-assured behaviors and attention seeking
behaviors, along with top management team characteristics can help explain how CEO
narcissism can influence firm performance. While the current literature has suggested the first
two set of behaviors, these mechanisms have not been empirically tested. Further, because
narcissistic individuals tend to develop complicated patterns of relationship, we consider that the
top management team is a potential mechanism that also warrants attention. Last, we perform
subgroup analyses to assess potential study moderators. Our findings show that when accounting
for CEO characteristics, firm factors, and corporate governance, the association between CEO
narcissism and firm performance is smaller than the reported by Cragun et al. (2020). Moreover,
our mediation analyses shows a complex and intricated relationship between CEO narcissism
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and firm performance via the positive indirect effects of self-assuredness and attention-seeking,
and negative indirect effects of the top management characteristics.
This study provides several theoretical and practical contributions. First, we find that the
contribution of the CEO narcissism to firm performance is smaller than previously thought. Most
importantly, our mediation analysis of self-assuredness, attention-seeking, and top management
team characteristics shows that the relation between CEO narcissism and firm performance can
be driven by specific behaviors – mechanisms – displayed by narcissistic CEOs. Scholars have
highlighted the necessity of examining mediators and processes involving CEOs’ attributes as
well as considering a configurational perspective, in which CEO traits and demographics,
corporate governance factors, and top management team variables are considered concurrently in
order to unravel the CEO effect (Busenbark et al., 2016; Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017; Liu et al.,
2018). Our findings, thus, reinforce the importance of examining mechanisms and a
configurational approach to examine executives-related phenomena.
Second, our study advances the previous meta-analysis on CEO characteristics (Wang et
al, 2016) and CEO narcissism (Cragun et al., 2020) by examining the impact of control variables
and study artifacts in relation to firm performance. Although it was not the focus of our analysis,
this study can also shed considerable light on the validity of various unobtrusive measures to
assess CEO narcissism. Last, our study offers the first systematic comparison, at the best of our
knowledge, on the explanatory power of a CEO demographics variable and psychological
constructs. Although CEO demographics are envisioned as proxy for psychological constructs
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984), CEO age and tenure displayed significant explanatory power even
though they relate to similar mechanisms as CEO narcissism.
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Theoretical Background And Hypotheses
Rooted in the behavioral theory of firm, upper echelons theory explains the executive
influence on firm strategic actions as a consequence of cognitive bias in the decision-making
process (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007). Under conditions of bounded rationality, - i.e., human limitations in accessing, processing, and using information (Simon, 1957) executives’ cognitive base, personality, experience, and values all serve to filter the processes of
attention, selection, and interpretation of the factors related to a firm’s external and internal
environment, as well as the firm’s goals. Thereafter, these executive attributes are reflected in the
strategic actions undertaken - that is, those activities that demand a significant commitment of
resources and are difficult to implement and reverse (Connelly et al., 2010) - and consequently
shape firm performance.
Narcissism is a multifaced personality trait (APA, 2013) with an intricate pattern of
positive and negative behaviors associated to it in both the short and long term (Campbell et al.,
2004; Miller et al., 2017). CEO narcissism has attracted considerable attention after Chatterjee
and Hambrick (2007) proposed an unobtrusive measure of CEO narcissism, which became the
most used measure of CEO narcissism (Cragun et al., 2020). Since that study, narcissistic CEOs
have been consistently associated with strategic actions such as firm diversification, mergers and
acquisitions, internationalization, and research and development (Cragun et al., 2020). In
particular, scholars have focused on how the attention seeking and self-assuredness of
narcissistic CEOs influence their preference for specific strategic firm actions.
Meta-analytic studies have shown that by pursuing strategic actions that are positively
related to firm performance, narcissistic CEOs can be linked to ensuing firm performance (Wang
et al., 2016). Specifically, Patel and Cooper (2014) found that after a crisis period, narcissistic
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CEOs are more prone to take strategic actions to enhance firm performance, resulting in a
quicker recovery than firms led by non-narcissistic CEOs. Similarly, Reina et al. (2014) showed
that when narcissistic CEOs have higher organizational identification, they are more likely to
produce positive firm performance because the firm performance itself represents a
reinforcement of their self-identity. Furthermore, in a very recent meta-analysis, Cragun et al.
(2020) indicates that indeed CEO narcissism is positively associated with firm performance.
Hence, in line with the previous literature, we hypothesize:
H1: CEO narcissism is positively related to firm performance.
CEO Narcissism Mechanisms: Self-Assuredness, Attention-Seeking, And Top Management
Team Characteristics
Narcissism is a complex personality trait with several behavioral tendencies associated
with it (Back et al., 2013; Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017; Miller et al., 2017). Strategy scholars have
highlighted the importance of two different mechanisms – self-assuredness and attention-seeking
– to explain why narcissistic CEOs engage in a myriad of strategic actions. We further argue
self-assuredness and attention-seeking will actually mediate the relationship between CEO
narcissism and firm performance.
Narcissistic individuals are self-assured in terms of their intelligence, competence, and
leadership (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017). As a result, narcissistic
CEOs tend to minimize their odds of failure, to overestimate the quality of the information they
possess, and to see themselves as more capable than peers (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Gupta
& Misangyi, 2018). Narcissist self-assuredness leads, for instance, to more diversification and
mergers and acquisitions because narcissist CEOs believe they can generate and extract value
from firms when compared to their peers (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). Likewise, narcissistic
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CEOs are more likely to engage with technological disruptions (Gerstner et al., 2013) and
challenging strategic actions, e.g., internationalizing to countries with a higher psychic distance
(Oesterle et al., 2016), as they believe they have a better capacity to understand and deal with
complex issues. By setting up the narcissistic CEOs to deploy strategic actions associated with
positive performance (Wang et al, 2016) self-assuredness mediates the positive association
between CEO narcissism and firm performance. Therefore, we hypothesize:
H2a: Self-assuredness positively mediates the relationship between CEO narcissism and
firm performance
Although narcissistic individuals display self-assuredness, their inflated self-view require
constant validation from others (Miller et al., 2017). Consequently, narcissistic individuals tend
to pursue actions that allow them to gather attention and acclamation from others in order to
constantly reinforce their grandiose self (Back et al., 2013). Narcissistic CEOs, therefore, may be
more likely to engage with strategic actions that will bring positive coverage from the media or
praise from other audiences. Narcissistic CEOs, for instance, will engage in highly visible
actions such as corporate social responsibility (Petrenko et al., 2016), mergers and acquisitions
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), and investment in unconventional strategic actions (Gerstner et
al., 2013; Ham et al., 2018) in order to bring attention to themselves. In studying biotechnology
firms, Gerstner et al. (2013) found that narcissistic CEOs allocated more attention and resources
to disruptive technologies, as these activities generated greater visibility to them. Accordingly,
similar to self-assuredness, the pursuit of attention-seeking behaviors leads narcissistic CEOs to
engage in strategic activities with the potential to generate positive firm performance. Therefore,
we hypothesize:
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H2b: Attention-seeking positively mediates the relationship between CEO narcissism and
firm performance.
On the other hand, there are several narcissistic behaviors such as seeking attention,
devaluating others, and dominating decision-making processes, that make narcissists well known
for their lack of likeability in long term relationships (Back et al., 2013). We expect, then, that
these behaviors influence how narcissistic CEOs interact with other top management team
members, which includes all executives above the vice-president level (e.g. CEO, COO, CFO, as
well as vice-presidents) (Carpenter et al., 2004; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). Upper echelons
scholars have long posited the importance of top management team in determining firm strategic
actions and firm performance (Carpenter et al., 2004; Certo et al., 2006); here we expect that
narcissistic CEOs have a negative effect on the top management team dynamics.
Specifically, strategy scholars have argued that particular top management team
characteristics, e.g., top management team members’ composition and interaction, can explain
the effectiveness of top management teams (Hambrick, 1994; Smith et al., 1994). For instance,
Smith et al. (1994) argued that social integration, informal communication and frequency of
communication are essential characteristics of a top management team. Social integration refers
to the cohesion of the group, and the satisfaction of group members with each other. Informal
communication is the extent to which top management team member favor less formal
communication channels. Thirdly, communication frequency refers to the amount of interaction
among team members. Similarly, Hambrick (1994) proposed that increasing collaboration among
members, exchanging of information, and making joint decisions can make top management
teams more effective. Indeed, in their meta-analysis, Certo et al. (2006) found evidence that top
management team size alone is positively related to firm performance (sales growth), and that

11

functional diversity and tenure diversity are also positively related to firm performance (return
on assets).
Moreover, CEOs have consistently emerged as a predominant driver of top management
team dynamics and effectiveness (Simsek et al., 2005). CEOs, as formal leaders, have the
authority to shape the size, the characteristics, and the dynamics of top management teams.
CEOs with transformational and empowering leadership styles, for example, are more likely to
embrace and motivate the participation of members in the decision-making process and to
facilitate the exchange of information across the team (Carmeli et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2015).
In the same vein, founder CEOs tend to decrease top management team integration because
when the CEOs’ power increases, top management team members become afraid of fully
engaging in the decision-making process due to the threat of bringing antipathy from founder
CEOs (Buyl et al., 2011).
While characteristics of the top management team, such as size and diversity in tenure,
functional background, and nationality, have been associated with such outcomes as firm
performance, innovation, and corporate entrepreneurship (Boone et al., 2019; Certo et al., 2006;
Talke et al., 2010), narcissistic CEOs are expected to negatively impact the top management
teams’ composition and interactions (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017). The limited research available
indicates that CEO narcissism indeed negatively influences top management team integration
and decision-making (Reina et al., 2014; She et al., 2020). Then, we argue that narcissistic CEOs
negatively impacts the top management team characteristics associated with firm performance.
Therefore, we hypothesize:
H2c: Top Management Team characteristics negatively mediate the relationship between
CEO narcissism and firm performance.
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CEO Narcissism And CEO Demographics
For some period of time now, upper echelons scholars have relied on the demographic
characteristics of executives as a proxy for cognitive processes (Carpenter et al., 2004;
Hambrick, 2007). CEO age, for example, was used to proxy the willingness of CEOs to take on
greater risk. Specifically, younger CEOs are thought more likely to engage with new strategic
actions because they seek to increase both firm and personal wealth, and do not recognize that
the strategic actions they initiate may not generate their envisioned outcomes (Wang et al.,
2016). Likewise, CEO tenure has been employed as an indicator of a tendency toward
persistence and commitment to status quo (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). Scholars have also
suggested that CEO tenure may reflect overconfidence and complacency, as it can reflect past
positive evaluations that serve to maintain a CEO’s tenure (Miller, 1991). As might be expected,
higher CEO tenure has thus been empirically linked to fewer strategic actions and lower firm
performance (Wang et al., 2016).
Age and tenure can thus both serve to proxy for cognitive bias that may arise from a
personality trait. In the case of narcissism, CEOs may be biased toward risky taking,
overconfidence or new ideas, which may be picked up by these correlated proxies. Because
narcissism is a psychological construct, though, it should more directly estimate the likelihood of
the cognitive bias, and thus, we anticipate CEO narcissism will explain more of the variance in
firm performance than demographic variables. However, given that age and tenure can explain
further cognitive biases not related to CEO narcissism (for instance age may pick up
complacency), we do not expect that CEO narcissism will fully substitute for relationships with
these demographics. Thus, we hypothesize
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H3: CEO narcissism has higher overall explanatory power than CEO Age and CEO
Tenure on firm performance.
Controlled Or Controlling? CEO Narcissism Discretion And Corporate Governance
Restrains
Although the power of CEOs has increased in the last twenty years (Quigley &
Hambrick, 2015), they are far from free of constraints. Most prominently, CEOs are subjected to
a corporate governance structure, which involves a set of mechanisms used to protect the rights
and interest of firm’s stakeholders and to shape and control both the strategic direction and firm
performance (Cowen & Marcel, 2011; Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2014). These controls are
essential to minimizing managerial opportunism, (self-interest seeking with guile, Williamson,
1993), that arises from the nonalignment between CEO interests and owner interests, paired with
the difficulty and costs necessary to verify what CEOs are actually doing (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Thus, three internal corporate governance mechanisms, thus, have been suggested as a way to
mitigate managerial opportunism: executive compensation, board of directors, and ownership
concentration control (Dalton et al., 2007). Consequently, we argue that corporate governance
mechanisms will influence the manifestation of CEO narcissism its association with a firm
performance.
As a governance mechanism, executive compensation seeks to align CEO interest with
shareholders by attaching the economic wealth of executives to the wealth of shareholders
(Dalton et al., 2007). A primary instrument is to grant stock in the executive compensation
package to turn the CEO into a shareholder. This variable of CEO ownership, or the level of the
firm’s common stock possessed by CEO, has regularly been used to evaluate whether granting
stock privileges actually helps to mitigate managerial opportunism and to improve firm
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performance. Research so far indicates a moderate level of CEO ownership has been positively
associated with both more efficient management and firm performance (Griffith, 1999; Kim &
Lu, 2011; Lilienfeld‐Toal & Ruenzi, 2014).
In contrast to executive compensation, boards of directors and ownership concentration
seek to increase monitoring of executive actions rather than the of aligning interests. The board
of directors refers to a set of individuals elected by shareholders to act in the shareholders’ best
interest, specifically in relation to controlling and monitoring the CEO and other executives
(Dalton et al., 2007). In particular, the independence of the board of directors, i.e., the degree to
which the board of directors is independent from management (Dalton et al., 2007), has been a
key variable associated with better monitoring of executives (Dalton et al., 2007). Moreover,
scholars have considered ownership concentration, the number of large-block shareholders, and
institutional investors as further alternative forms to improve control (Dalton et al., 2007),
because these actors have considerable stakes in the firm and are then more interested in
controlling and influencing executive actions (Bushee et al., 2013; Connelly et al., 2010; Krause
et al., 2014). Meta-analytic studies, though, have not found a consistent effect for board
independence and institutional ownership in relationship to firm performance; rather, research
suggests that it is the presence of contextual factors that then influence these relationships
(Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 2007; Sundaramurthy et al., 2005).
However, an alternative explanation to the traditional perspective on corporate
governance is that narcissistic CEOs engage may engage in behaviors to manipulate the
influence of the corporate governance structure in order to improve their discretion. Several
scholars have shown that CEOs can use their social influence and norms of reciprocity to shape

15

their environment (Belliveau et al., 1996; Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Westphal & Bednar, 2008;
Westphal & Khanna, 2003; Westphal & Zajac, 2013; Zajac & Westphal, 1995).
For example, to ease the constraints from investors and directors, CEOs may engage in
ingratiation behaviors, which includes opinion conformity and flattery, towards those actors as a
means to trigger reciprocity, attraction, and attachment from them (Westphal & Zajac, 2013).
Westphal (1998), for instance, showed that CEOs who engaged in ingratiation behaviors towards
independent directors neutralized the effects of board independence on a variety of corporate
policies – from executive compensation to strategic actions. In the same vein, Stern and
Westphal (2010) found that executives engage in subtle forms of flattery and opinion conformity,
e.g. referencing shared social affiliations or life experiences, to elicit positive affect and
assessments of their capabilities and performance from the target. Interestingly, in the personality
psychology literature indicates that narcissistic individuals are positively associated with the use
of ingratiatory behaviors (Hart et al., 2017), of social intelligence (Nagler et al., 2014), and of
reciprocity behaviors (Jonason & Webster, 2012) as a form to reinforce their self-concept (Hart
et al., 2017). It is not unlikely that narcissistic CEOs may try to engage in social influence and
norms of reciprocity to increase their compensation and discretion in order to reinforce their
grandiose self.
Thus, the ability of corporate governance structures (in terms of CEO ownership,
institutional ownership, and independence of board of directors) to rein in CEO behaviors may
be influenced by CEO narcissism. On the one hand, then, the CEO-narcissism to firm
performance may be reined in by these corporate structures as originally formulated in the
literature. Alternatively, thought, narcissistic CEOs may actually be more likely to weaken these
constraints in their favor, and thus mediate the relationship between governance structures and
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firm performance. Accordingly, we investigate a set of competing hypotheses to examine
whether CEO narcissism mediates the association between corporate governance structure and
firm performance, or conversely, or the corporate governance structure mediates the CEO
narcissism-firm performance relationship.
H4a: CEO narcissism partially mediates the relationship between CEO ownership and
firm performance.
H4b: CEO ownership partially mediates the relationship between CEO narcissism and
firm performance.
H5a: CEO narcissism partially mediates the relationship between independence of board
of directors and firm performance.
H5b: Independence of board of directors partially mediates the relationship between
CEO narcissism and firm performance.
H6a: CEO narcissism partially mediates the relationship between institutional ownership
and firm performance.
H6b: Institutional ownership partially mediates the relationship between CEO narcissism
and firm performance.
Methods
Identification Of Studies
We combined a database search with a manual search to identify papers using the
construct of CEO narcissism. In the first step, we searched the keyword “CEO narcissism” in the
field “topic” of Web of Science, retrieving 129 studies. Next, we performed a manual search of
all of the papers citing Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) in Google Scholar – approximately 1800
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papers. Finally, we used the ProQuest Dissertations and Theses and the Social Science Research
Network databases to search for unpublished studies.
After identifying only those studies with at least one bivariate correlation involving CEO
narcissism and another relevant variable, our final corpus consists of 57 articles (63 studies), 51
published articles (56 studies) and six unpublished articles (seven studies). We examined each
unpublished study to verify it was not already published. The 57 articles were published in 30
journals (see Table 1 for the five most represented journals), covering the fields of management,
international business, leadership, applied psychology, accounting, and finance.
Table 1 Journals With Most Articles
Journal

# articles

Administrative Science Quarterly

7

Strategic Management Journal

5

Leadership Quarterly

4

Journal of Business Ethics

3

Journal of Business Research

3

Coding
For each study, we extracted information about sample size, the bivariate correlation,
mean, standard deviation, and reliability (if reported). Moreover, we coded data for the specific
measure of CEO narcissism, the source of the CEO narcissism measure, the firm performance
measure, whether the study was single-industry, and the field and journal tier as informed by the
Chartered Association of Business Schools’ Academic Journal Guide. When a study reported
separate effect sizes for multiple dimensions of a construct (e.g., accounting and market
performance), we included both effects in the analysis as they reflect different dimensions of the
construct. Simulation studies show that completeness of information over stochastic
independence of effect size, as meta-analyses that contain all operationalizations of a focal effect
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tend to outperform procedures representing by a single compositive value in terms of mean effect
and confidence interval accuracy (Bijmolt & Pieters, 2001; Drees & Heugens, 2013)
Dependent Variable
Firm performance is defined as “the economic outcomes resulting from the interplay
among an organization’s attributes, actions, and environment” (Combs et al., 2005, p. 261) and
includes accounting returns, stock market performance, and growth. We recorded three types of
firm performance: accounting measures (return on assets), market measures (total shareholder
return, Tobin’s Q), and subjective measures.
Independent Variable
The degree to which the CEO exhibits narcissism traits involves measures such as the
narcissism index (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), the videometric-approach (Petrenko et al.,
2016), the narcissistic personality inventory (NPI) (Raskin & Hall, 1979), the signature size
(Ham et al., 2018), along with some idiosyncratic other measures.
Mediator Variables
CEO self-assuredness represents the confidence of CEOs in their ability to make
decisions and to lead the firm (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). We included variables such as
confidence, extraversion, and charisma as an expression of CEO self-assuredness (Back et al.,
2013; Miller et al., 2017).
CEO attention-seeking represents the narcissists’ ongoing search to receive attention and
praise for their actions from audiences (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Petrenko et al., 2016). To
proxy for these behaviors, we relied on measures such as media coverage, media appearances,
and number of articles written about the CEO to reflect the theoretical outcome of attentionseeking efforts.
19

Finally, because top management teams have received less attention from scholars as
either explanatory or control variables in articles examining CEO narcissism, we proxy the top
management team characteristics by aggregating all variables in our samples that could be
linked to impacting top management team effectiveness. Representative examples include
characteristics such as size, tenure, and tenure diversity, that have been associated with firm
performance (Certo et al., 2006), as well as the degree of integration of its members and
collective decision-making (Hambrick, 1994; Smith et al., 1994).
Control Variables
We included several control variables in our estimation models to account for potential
confounding variables. At the firm-level, we controlled for firm size and age. Firm size measures
include raw and log transformation of total assets, sales, and employees. In their meta-analysis,
Cragun et al. (2020) found a positive associated between CEO narcissism and firm size. Firm age
was also tested using raw and log transformations of the number of years since foundation or
initial public offering.
At the CEO-level, we included CEO age (Wang et al., 2016) as a control variable because
personality psychology literature has shown association between these two variables. Moreover,
we controlled for CEO tenure, i.e., the length of time the CEO has served as CEO in the firm
(Wang et al., 2016). Narcissistic CEOs may have a higher attrition, and tenure can also
potentially reflect the power of the CEO inside the firm. Additionally, we controlled for CEO
duality – whether the CEO holds both the CEO and Chairman of the Board position – which is
linked in research to the power of the CEO (Krause et al., 2014). Last, we included level of CEO
ownership as this mechanism is designed to align the interest of CEOs and firm’s shareholders.
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We aggregated variables using the percentage of shares owned, number of shares owned, and
options held by the CEO as they represent different forms of stakes that the CEO has in the firm.
Finally, we controlled for two additional forms of corporate governance controls. First,
we included outside directors that indicates the independence of the board of directors and can
influence the power of the CEO (Joseph et al., 2014). In our sample, outside directors were
measured both as the percentage of outside director or as the number of outside directors.
Second, we included institutional ownership as a control variable, as these owners have been
lined to enhanced monitoring of firm actions. We aggregated the variables measuring the
percentage of institutional ownership, ownership of blockholders, number of institutional
owners, and number of blockholders.
Estimation procedures
To perform our estimation, we followed the procedures outlined for Berg et al. (2016)
and Hunter and Schmidt (2014). For each pair of variables, we performed a meta-analysis
correcting for measurement error in both independent and dependent variables and using a
random-effect estimator. Correcting for measurement error reduces the downward bias in the
correlations and allows more accurate estimates in multivariate analysis (Hunter & Schmidt,
2014). Following previous research, we set the reliability to .80 if one is not reported in the study
because it represents a conservative value for meta-analyses according to a comprehensive
review of effect sizes reported in management journal (Aguinis et al., 2011). We employed the
“psychmeta” package in R (Dahlke & Wiernik, 2019) to perform the artefact corrections and
estimate the effect sizes.
With the correlation matrix of meta-analytic effect sizes, we use structural equation
modelling to fit path analysis models to test our hypotheses with the “lavaan” package in R
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(Rosseel, 2012). We calculated the harmonic sample mean, which gives less weight to large
sample sizes and provides more conservative parameter estimates, to account for the differences
in the sample size (Berg et al. 2016). We used a path analysis model to evaluate hypotheses 1-3,
along with the Z-test, which assesses slope difference (Clogg et al., 1995), and the epsilon
statistic, which examines the proportion of total variance explained by one variable (Johnson &
LeBreton, 2004) to evaluate the hypothesis 3. We employed the goodness of fit indices to assess
the competing hypotheses 4-6.
Results
Table 2 summarizes the correlation results of our variables as well as the number of
studies (k), sample size (n), and the confidence and credibility intervals for each variable pair. As
shown in Table 3 Model A, CEO narcissism had a significant and positive effect on firm
performance (β = .014, p = .05) after controlling for confounding factors.
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Table 2 Meta-analytic correlations
1
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

CEO Narcissism
CEO Self-assuredness

0.11(0.08)
17(26,358)
[0.01, 0.20]
{-0.14, 0.36}

CEO Attention seeking

0.51(0.41)
6(42,029)
[0.34, 0.68]
{0.27, 0.75}

-

-0.12(-0.09)
8(1,585)
[-0.21, -0.02]
{-0.23, -0.01}

-

-

Firm Performance

0.01(0.01)
61(103,969)
[-0.02, 0.03]
{-0.13, 0.14}

0.07(0.05)
16(25,416)
[0.01, 0.11]
{-0.05, 0.18}

0.07(0.05)
10(83,406)
[0.04, 0.10]
{0.01, 0.13}

0.18(0.14)
4(286)
[-0.22, 0.57]
{-0.16, 0.52}

CEO Age

0.02(0.01)
41(64,669)
[0.00, 0.05]
{-0.09, 0.13}

0.01(0.01)
7(7,215)
[-0.04, 0.05]
{-0.04, 0.05}

-0.04(-0.03)
6(42,029)
[-0.05, -0.03]
{-.04, -.04}

0.04(0.03)
4(476)
[-0.20, 0.29]
{-0.13, 0.22}

-0.04(-0.03)
41(79,293)
[-0.06, -0.01]
{-0.12, 0.04}

CEO Duality

0.07(0.05)
23(44,558)
[0.03, 0.10]
{-0.02, 0.15}

0.00(0.00)
5(4,914)
[-0.10, 0.10]
{-0.10, -0.11}

0.12(0.09)
6(42,029)
[0.08, 0.14]
{0.07, 0.15}

-

0.00(0.00)
27(64,518)
[-0.02, 0.03]
{-0.08, 0.09}

0.21(0.16)
19(41,843)
[0.14, 0.27]
{0.03, 0.39}

0.01(0.01)
21(42,674)
[-0.07, 0.09]
{-0.24, 0.26}

0.01(0.01)
7(9,060)
[-0.05, 0.06]
{-0.07, 0.08}

-0.04(-0.03)
5(41,898)
[-0.08, 0.01]
{-0.09, 0.02}

-

0.08(0.06)
24(63,266)
[0.04, 0.11]
{-0.01, 0.17}

0.11(.09)
15(39,169)
[0.04,0.17]
{-0.04, 0.27}

2

3
TMT Characteristics
4

5

6

7
CEO Ownership
8
CEO Tenure

0.10(0.08)
15(37,675)
[0.06, 0.13]
{0.02, 0.17}

0.02(0.01)
0.05(0.04)
-0.03(-0.02)
0.45(0.36)
0.02(0.02)
0.45(0.35)
0.18(0.14)
0.40(0.32)
36(55,572)
8(5,889)
6(42,029)
7(1,488)
34(67,788)
28(52,085)
19(40,187)
17(38,476)
9
[-0.01, 0.05]
[-0.09, 0.19]
[-.05, 0.00]
[0.10, 0.79]
[-0.01, 0.04]
[0.38, 0.51]
[0.13, 0.22] [0.31, 0.49]
{-0.10, 0.13}
{-0.18, 0.28}
{-.06, 0.00}
{-0.08, 0.97} {-0.08, 0.12} {0.22, 0.66} {0.05, 0.31} {0.16, 0.64}
Note: Line 1 corrected correlation (observed correlation); 2 number of studies (sample size); 3 95 percent confidence interval, 4 80 percent credible interval

23

Table 2 Continued
1

2

0.08(0.06)
26(38,893)
[0.04, 0.12]
{-0.03, 0.19}

Firm Size

0.16(0.12)
57(89,297)
[0.11, 0.20]
{-0.05, 0.37}

Institutional Ownership

0.01(0.01)
6(30,034)
[-0.13, 0.16]
{-0.19, 0.22}

Firm Age
10

11

12

3

4

5

6

7

8

0.03(0.03)
7(15,388)
[-0.08, 0.13]
{-0.13, 0.19}

-

0.23(0.18)
4(362)
[-0.08, 0.54]
{-0.01, 0.47}

0.04(0.02)
25(22,085)
[-0.03, 0.10]
{-0.17, 0.24}

0.20(0.15)
18(23,556)
[0.16, 0.23]
{0.11, 0.28}

0.06(0.05)
10(12,131)
[-0.04, 0.17]
{-0.14, 0.26}

-0.18(-0.14)
9(5,370)
[-0.23, -0.13]
{-0.24, -0.12}

0.01(0.01)
14(25,603)
[-0.07, 0.08]
{-0.17, 0.19}

0.33(0.26)
6(42,029)
[0.24, 0.41]
{0.21, 0.44}

0.04(0.03)
8(1,585)
[-0.10, 0.19]
{-0.17, 0.26}

-0.06(-0.05)
56(98,454)
[-0.12, 0.00]
{-0.34, 0.22}

0.13(0.10)
37(61,392)
[0.09, 0.16]
{0.01, 0.25}

0.17(0.13)
21(41,500)
[0.08, 0.26]
{-0.08, 0.46}

-0.08(-0.06)
18(36,806)
[-0.18, 0.02]
{-0.36, 0.19}

-

0.04(0.03)
5(42,376)
[0.00, 0.08]
{0.00, 0.08}

0.01(0.01)
4(22,414)
[-0.04, 0.05]
{-0.03, 0.05}

0.10(0.07)
3(21,755)
[-0.08, 0.27]
{-0.04, 0.23}

-

-

-

Outside Directors

0.04(0.03)
-0.03(-0.02)
-0.09(-0.07)
0.05(0.04)
0.09(0.07)
-0.11(-0.08)
8(9,234)
5(4,914)
8(10,587)
5(7,439)
6(8,754)
4(3,697)
13
[-0.01, 0.09] [-0.16, 0.09]
[-0.16, -0.01] [-0.01, 0.11] [-0.01, 0.19]
[-0.16, -0.04]
{-0.02, 0.11} {-0.18, 0.11}
{-0.21, 0.02} {-0.01, 0.11} {-.05, 0.23} {-0.10, -0.10}
Note: Line 1 corrected correlation (observed correlation); 2 number of studies (sample size); 3 95 percent confidence interval, 4 80 percent credible interval

24

Table 2 Continued
9
9

10

11

12

CEO Tenure
Firm Age

0.03(0.02)
15(17,233)
[-0.05, 0.10]
{-0.16, 0.21}

Firm Size

-0.02(-0.01)
32(52,295)
[-0.06, 0.03]
{-0.19, 0.16}

10

11
Institutional Ownership
12

-

0.24(0.19)
26(38,893)
[0.15, 0.31]
{-0.01, 0.49}
-0.11(-0.08) 0.04(0.03)
3(8,279)
6(30,034)
[-0.32, 0.11] [-0.13, 0.21]
{-0.26, 0.05} {-0.20, 0.28}

Outside Directors

-0.02(-0.02) 0.04(0.03)
0.04(0.03)
6(8,721)
3(6,959)
7(8,986)
13
[-0.15, 0.10] [-0.22, 0.31] [-0.08, 0.16]
{-0.19, 0.14} {-0.15, 0.24} {-0.14, 0.22}
Note: Line 1 corrected correlation (observed correlation); 2 number of studies (sample size); 3 95 percent confidence interval, 4 80 percent credible interval
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Table 3 Results of Path Analysis Models on Firm Performance
Model A
Firm
Performance

Model B
CEO SelfFirm
assuredness
Performance

CEO Narcissism
CEO Selfassuredness
CEO Attention
seeking
TMT
Characteristics

0.014(0.007)

0.11(0.006)

CEO Age

-0.054(0.008)

-0.02(0.007)

-0.043(0.007)

-0.102(0.004)

-0.032(0.005)

CEO Duality

0.019(0.008)

-0.009(0.007)

0.012(0.007)

0.062(0.004)

0.004(0.005)

CEO Tenure

0(0.009)

0.064(0.008)

0(0.008)

0.007(0.004)

0.003(0.005)

CEO Ownership

0.083(0.008)

-0.016(0.007)

0.078(0.007)

-0.018(0.004)

0.079(0.005)

Firm Size

-0.07(0.008)

-0.005(0.007)

-0.055(0.007)

0.258(0.004)

-0.086(0.005)

Firm Age

0.079(0.008)

Outside Directors

-0.085(0.007)

R2

Model C
CEO Attention
Firm
seeking
Performance

0.008(0.006)

0.47(0.004)

-0.042(0.005)

Model D
TMT
Firm
Characteristics
Performance
-0.152(0.019)

0.048(0.023)

0.067(0.006)
0.121(0.005)
0.223(0.027)

0.024

AIC
51716.012
Note: standard errors in parenthesis

0.015

0.016

0.338

138634.427

0.021
263714.026
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-0.263(0.021)

-0.002(0.026)

0.563(0.021)

-0.084(0.029)

0.044(0.019)

-0.081(0.023)

0.273(0.019)

0.001(0.024)

0.324

0.044
10365.911

Our findings, thus, provide support to the previous meta-analysis showing a positive
association between CEO narcissism and firm performance. However, after accounting for
confounding variables, the effect size is 4.28 times smaller than that reported for Craung et al.
(2020).
For Hypothesis 3, which we hypothesize that CEO narcissism would have higher overall
explanatory power than CEO age and tenure, we did not find support. The results of Z-tests show
that the regression coefficient of CEO narcissism (β = .014, p = .05) was significantly smaller
than the coefficient of CEO age (β = -.054, p < .01, Z = 6.36, p < .01) and not statistically
different than the coefficient of CEO tenure (β = .000, p = .99, Z = 1.22, p = .78). Moreover, the
analyses of relative weights indicate that CEO age explained about eight percent of variance in
firm performance, and CEO tenure and CEO narcissism explained respectively two percent and
one percent of variance in firm performance. Altogether, H3 was not supported as these
demographics had more explanatory power than CEO narcissism.
As we predicted in H2a, we expected that self-assuredness would positively mediate the
relationship between CEO narcissism and firm performance. Our findings, Table 3 Model B,
provide support for H2a indicating that the indirect relationship of CEO narcissism on firm
performance through self-assuredness is positive and statistically significant (β = .007, p < .01).
The direct effect of CEO narcissism is no longer significant (β = .008, p = .22), suggesting more
of a full mediation relationship. Self-assuredness is positive and statistically associated with firm
performance (𝛽 = .067, p < .01), and CEO narcissism is also associated positively with selfassuredness (𝛽 = .11, p < .01).
H2b, which predicts that attention-seeking would positively mediate the relationship
between CEO narcissism and firm performance, was supported. Our findings, Table 3 Model C,
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show that the indirect effect of CEO narcissism on firm performance by attention seeking is
positive and statistically significant (β = .057, p < .01). The direct effect of CEO narcissism on
firm performance is negative and statistically significant (β = -.042, p < .01), indicating that CEO
narcissism may have opposite mechanisms associated with firm performance. In addition, the
direct effect of CEO narcissism on attention seeking is positive and statistically significant (β =
.470, p < .01) is in line with the literature.
As we predicted in H2c, we expected that top management team characteristics would
negatively mediate the relation between CEO narcissism and firm performance. Our findings
(see Table 3 Model D) offer support to H2c as the indirect effect of CEO narcissism on firm
performance by top management team characteristics is negative and statistically significant (𝛽 =
-.034, p < .01). Similar to the attention seeking mediation model, the direct effect of CEO
narcissism on firm performance is in the opposite direction of the indirect effect (𝛽 = .048, p =
.03). As we theorized, the direct effect of CEO narcissism on top management team
characteristics is negative and statistically significant (𝛽 = -.152, p < .01). The intricated pattern
of opposite mechanisms linking CEO narcissism and firm performance helps us to understand
why CEO age and tenure displayed higher power explanatory power than CEO narcissism.
While narcissistic CEOs can positively influence firm performance, they can also hinder it in
such way that suppress the positive effects.
From H4a-6b, we tested two competing models regarding the role of corporate
governance structure and their interaction with CEO narcissism. Because institutional ownership
is not included often with other control variables, it regularly has missing correlations with other
variables in published studies. Given this constraint, we tested the mediation hypotheses
regarding institutional ownership separately from CEO ownership and outside directors. Table 4
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Model A displays the regression coefficients for the monitoring explanation (i.e., that effective
boards lower CEO impacts), and Model B shows those for the CEO manipulating explanation
(i.e., that narcissistic CEOs dilute board mechanisms).
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Table 4: Competing path models on CEO Narcissism and Governance Structure
Model A
CEO
Firm
Narcissism
Performance
CEO
Narcissism
Outside
Directors
CEO
Ownership
Institutional
Ownership

0.018(0.007)

CEO
Ownership

Model B
Outside
Directors

Firm
Performance

Model C
CEO
Firm
Narcissism
Performance

0.012(0.007)

0.041(0.007)

0.018(0.007)

0.017(0.007)

0.043(0.007)

0.068(0.007)

-0.085(0.007)

0.016(0.007)

-0.085(0.007)

0.068(0.007)
0.012(0.007)

Model D
Institutional
Firm
Ownership
Performance
0.012(0.007)

0.017(0.007)

0.046(0.007)

0.046(0.007)

CEO Age

-0.039(0.007)

-0.039(0.007)

-0.034(0.007)

-0.034(0.007)

CEO Duality

0.019(0.007)

0.019(0.007)

0.014(0.007)

0.014(0.007)

Firm Size

-0.055(0.007)

-0.055(0.007)

-0.066(0.007)

-0.066(0.007)

R2

0.002

0.019

0

0.002

0.017

0

0.008

0

0.008

AIC

113669.31

170705.59

113921.87

113921.87

CFI

0.43

0.269

0.219

0.423

RMSEA

0.095

0.088

0.095

0.059

SRMR
0.032
Note: standard errors in parenthesis

0.043

0.038

0.023
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Model A, the monitoring explanation, had better fit indexes (CFI = .43, RMSEA = .095,
SRMR = .032) than the Model B (CFI = .26, RMSEA = .088, SRMR = .043), indicating support
to hypotheses H4a and H5a, which predict respectively CEO narcissism mediates the
relationship between CEO ownership (outside directors) and firm performance. Table 4 Model C
and Model D display the different pattern favoring the controlling explanation as the fit indexes
are better in Model D (CFI = 0.21, RMSEA = 0.09, SRMR = .038 versus CFI = .42, RMSEA =
.059, SRMR = .023). It provides support for hypothesis H6b.
Post-hoc Analyses
We conducted several post hoc analyses to assess the impact of different measures of
narcissism, source, and industry in our results regarding the association between CEO narcissism
and firm performance while controlling for a small set of confounding variables. The findings
are summarized in the Table 5. The analysis across different measures of CEO narcissism –
Chatterjee and Hambrick (CH) index, pronoun use, NPI, and videometric – shows the association
between CEO narcissism and firm performance is higher for the videometric measure (𝛽 = .075,
p < .001) and smaller for the NPI measure (𝛽 = -.062, p < .001). The videometric is also
statistically higher than all other narcissism measures (CH index Z = 4.89, p < .01, Pronoun Use
Z = 4.65, p < .01). The NPI measure is statistically smaller than other narcissism measures (CH
index Z = -3.67, p < .01, Pronoun use Z = -3.77, p < .01). There is no difference between CH
index and Pronoun use.
When considering the source of the narcissism measure – archival, self-reported, or thirdparty rater, we found no difference between the archival and the self-reported narcissism
measure (Z = .44, p = .65). However, the association between CEO narcissism and firm
performance is significantly higher for measures using third-party raters than self-reported (Z =
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3.02, p < .01) and archival measures (Z = 5.85, p < .01). Last, there is no difference regarding
studies with single or multi-industry (Z = 1.01, p = .31).
Table 5: Post-hoc analysis of sub-group analysis
Panel A Narcissism Measure

CEO Narcissism
CEO Age
CEO Tenure
Firm Size

CH Index
Firm Performance
0.021(0.005)
-0.05(0.006)
0.039(0.006)
-0.059(0.005)

Pronoun Use
Firm Performance
0.023(0.005)
-0.047(0.006)
0.039(0.006)
-0.059(0.005)

NPI
Firm Performance
-0.062(0.022)
-0.05(0.025)
0.046(0.025)
-0.051(0.023)

Videometric
Firm Performance
0.075(0.01)
-0.038(0.012)
0.035(0.011)
-0.062(0.01)

0.007

0.01

0.012

Archival
Firm Performance
0.012(0.004)
-0.049(0.004)

Self-reported
Firm Performance
0.002(0.022)
-0.049(0.025)

Third-party rater
Firm Performance
0.075(0.01)
-0.039(0.011)

0.039(0.004)
-0.058(0.004)

0.039(0.025)
-0.056(0.022)

0.034(0.011)
-0.062(0.01)

0.006

0.012

R2
0.007
Note: standard errors in parenthesis

Panel B Measure Source

CEO Narcissism
CEO Age
CEO Tenure
Firm Size

R2
0.006
Note: standard errors in parenthesis

Panel C Industry

CEO Narcissism
CEO Age
CEO Tenure
Firm Size

Multi
Firm Performance
0.016(0.004)
-0.049(0.004)
0.039(0.004)
-0.058(0.004)

R2
0.006
Note: standard errors in parenthesis

Single
Firm Performance
0.025(0.008)
-0.049(0.009)
0.038(0.009)
-0.061(0.008)
0.007

Discussion
Our aim in this meta-analytic review is to contribute to literature the impact of chief
executives in firm outcomes by examining the relation between CEO narcissism and firm
performance, and further, by exploring the mechanisms underlying the association. Drawing
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upon the narcissism and top management team literature, we proposed and found that CEO
narcissism is positively associated with firm performance and that self-assuredness, attention
seeking, and top management team characteristics mediate this association. Nevertheless, the
effect of narcissism on top management team characteristics is in the opposition direction of selfassuredness and attention seeking, indicating that CEO narcissism has a complex and intricate
association with firm performance. Taken together, the results reported here helps us to
understand why the research on CEO narcissism has generated many equivocal findings.
By revisiting the findings from Cragun et al. (2020) and adding confounding variables in
the assessment of CEO narcissism and firm performance, this study shows that the association
between these two variables is considerable smaller when accounting for these effects.
Specifically, the effect size found for Cragun et al. (2020) is 4 times larger than the estimate we
obtained when accounting for confounding variables. Nevertheless, our post-hoc analyses
partially corroborate the Cragun et al. (2020) findings regarding the impact of different
narcissism measures in the association between CEO narcissism and firm performance; we found
significant difference in the relationship due to measurement metric.
However, we observed a different pattern. First, we found a considerable smaller
association between the Chatterjee and Hambrick index and firm performance than that reported
by Cragun et al. (2020) (.02 against .08). Second, our findings suggest that videometric measures
displayed the largest association with firm performance while NPI the smallest. Importantly, we
note that the diminished impact of NPI in measuring narcissism impacts on firm performance is
greatly influenced by two studies examining a sample of smaller firms. Third, when considering
the source of the measure, we found that only third-party raters displayed a statistically different,
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and higher, effect on firm performance. It may indicate that third-party raters may not be able to
fully grasp all dimensions of the narcissism.
One major contribution of this study to CEO narcissism and upper echelon theory is that
the results suggest differential effects of the mechanisms associated with CEO narcissism. This
finding is important both in theory and in the methodology of studies examining CEO
narcissism. Theoretically, this finding calls into question the previous research in which the
mechanisms associated with narcissism operate to influence firm performance in the same
direction. Rather, our findings suggest that different aspects related to the narcissism personality
may have different relationships with firm outcomes. For instance, there is the possibility that it
is not the self-assuredness of the narcissistic CEOs that leads to higher premium acquisition, but
the lack of proper input and checks at the top management team level. Therefore, we encourage
scholars to explore and consider the alternative mechanisms associated with the narcissism trait
to advance our knowledge on the relationship between CEO narcissism and firm outcomes.
The findings of the differential effects of the mechanisms associated with CEO
narcissism also offer methodological implications for the research on CEO narcissism and upper
echelons, more broadly. First, if the mechanisms associated with CEO narcissism can display
unique effects on firm outcomes, the failure to measure or proxy them, or the inability to account
for the multifaceted nature of the narcissism trait, leads to underdeveloping the influence of CEO
narcissism and, in the worst-case scenario, inaccurate results. Moving forward, we encourage
researchers to perform more mediation analyses to actually test the theorized mechanisms. This
suggestion is consistent with previous research that argued for more processual and
configurational approaches to examine CEOs, top management teams, and boards of directors
(Busenbark et al., 2016; Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017; Liu et al., 2018). As an alternative
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suggestion, researchers might try to capture the different facets of narcissism by improving our
current measures. For instance, based on Emmons (1987), scholars might explore how the effect
of the leadership/authority dimension differs that of entitlement dimension, and so on.
Limitations and Future Research
Several limitations should be noted in this current study. First, some studies included in
this meta-analysis used self-reported measures for firm performance, which could lead to
common method bias and, consequently, may inflate the correlations between CEO narcissism
and firm performance. Moreover, several studies, when operationalizing CEO narcissism, made
compromises, and had not followed the benchmark measure because of contextual factors and
data unavailability. For instance, scholars may not be able to measure the prominence of the
CEOs in annual reports because these reports are not common in the sample context (country).
Besides, meta-analysis uses bivariate correlations as inputs and cannot address the endogeneity
problems of self-selection, reverse causality, and omitted variables (Berg et al., 2016). Even if
studies differ in their degree of identification, this aspect is not accounted for in our analysis. The
results from our study, then, should be interpreted taking these limitations in consideration.
Future research should carefully think on identification strategies to minimize endogeneity
concerns. In addition, we encourage scholars to work to improve current measures of CEO
narcissism.
Second, there are several potential moderators that may influence the relationship
between CEO narcissism and firm performance. For instance, industry munificence, CEO power,
and corporate governance quality appear likely to influence the amount of managerial discretion
of narcissistic CEOs and their capacity to affect firm outcomes. However, because relatively few
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studies have the required information to allow subgroup analysis along these dimensions, we
were not able to examine the direct effects and mediating models separately.
A third limitation of this study is that we were unable to test our mediators – selfassuredness, attention seeking, and top management team characteristics – concomitantly
because not enough studies have included them together. Thus, even if they are theoretically
connected, for instance, self-assured individuals may get more coverage from media, we cannot
parse out these effects. If sufficient research studies moving forward examines these
mechanisms, future meta-analytic reviews will be in an improved position to account for these
impacts. Moreover, there are additional mechanisms such as selfishness, approach motivation,
and social dominance (Back et al., 2013; Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017; Miller et al., 2017) that are
associated with the narcissism trait that we are not able to examine. We recommend scholars not
only try to measure self-assuredness and attention seeking mechanisms themselves, but also seek
to examine the effects of other mechanisms associated with CEO narcissism.
Conclusions
This meta-analysis examined and extended the theoretical model linking CEO narcissism
with firm performance. We found that despite there being a positive association between CEO
narcissism and firm performance even after accounting for confounding factors, the mechanisms
underlying the association have differential effects on the relationship between these two
constructs. The ability to recognize and understand the processual implications of narcissism on
firm performance hold the key to improving our ability to inform firms and their boards on ideal
leadership traits. Narcissism can energize both more decisive and more risky behaviors that act
in contrasting ways in corporate functioning; it can also counteract effective monitoring and
possibly top management team integration. All of these impacts require unique responses to both
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harness the value and restrain the damage narcissism can inject into corporate functioning. We
conclude, then encouraging future research to explore with much greater precision these
mechanisms associated with CEO narcissism.
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Chapter 2: Not all outcomes are made equal: the complex link between CEO narcissism
and firm performance
Introduction
Upper echelon scholars have devoted substantial attention to understand the effects of
narcissism in top executives– defined as individuals who have inflated views of themselves, and
who seek to have those positive self-views continuously reinforced (Campbell et al., 2004) – in
impacting strategic decisions and firm performance through narcissism’s influence on how these
executives attend, perceive, and process information (Chatterjee & Hamrick, 2007; Gupta &
Misangyi, 2018; Ham et al., 2018; Cragun et al., 2020). However, it is not uncommon to find
evidence that this narcissism, notably in CEOs, can be associated with opposing firm outcome
variables. For instance, narcissism has been associated with both corporate social responsibility
(Petrenko et al., 2016) and misconduct (Scotter & Roglio, 2018), and with both positive and
negative firm performance (Ham et al., 2018; Patel & Cooper, 2014; Cragun et al., 2020). Albeit
uncovering undeniable advances, scholars have yet to unpack this conundrum on how CEO
narcissism – and personality traits and values more broadly – may lead to such opposite
outcomes.
One potential explanation lies in the multidimensionality of the narcissism trait. Although
the upper echelon literature thus far has employed CEO narcissism as a unidimensional construct
with scores ranging from low to high narcissism degree, the personality psychology literature has
long recognized the complexity of the narcissism trait (Krizan & Herlache, 2018; Miller et al.,
2017; Wink, 1991), and shown how its dimensions can be associated with different outcomes
(Ackerman et al., 2011, Emmons, 1984, 1987). In the workplace context, for example, Grijalva
and Newman (2015) found that two different dimensions of overall narcissism had opposite
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effects on outcomes. Specifically, the Leadership/Authority narcissism dimension correlated
negatively, whereas Exploitative/Entitlement narcissism dimension correlated positively, with
counterproductive work behavior. Consequently, individuals who appear to have a similar degree
of overall narcissism may display different behavioral tendencies depending on their narcissism
profile.
In this article, we embrace the multidimensionality of the narcissism trait to theorize how
it can lead to either positive or negative firm performance depending on the behavioral strategies
deployed by the narcissistic CEO. Specifically, we draw from personality psychology research
that identifies behavioral strategies that can be associated with the narcissism trait as a
consequence of a dynamic, self-regulatory process to construct, maintain, defend, and improve a
grandiose self (Back et al., 2013; Morf et al., 2011). In this perspective, the self-enhancement
strategy, narcissistic admiration, involves efforts to feel good about oneself and admired by
others, while the self-defense strategy, narcissistic rivalry, includes efforts to defend a grandiose
self from attacks, real or imagined, by others (Back et al., 2013). Accordingly, we argue that
narcissistic CEOs will be positively associated to firm performance when they display
narcissistic admiration behaviors, and negatively associated to firm performance when they show
narcissistic rivalry behaviors. To test our model, we draw a sample of 338 CEOs of S&P 500
firms from 2006 to 2018. Using return on assets (ROA) as our measure of firm performance, we
found support to our model as narcissistic admiration (rivalry) is positively (negatively)
associated with firm performance.
This paper provides several important theoretical implications for upper echelons theory
as well as practical applications. First, we develop a deeper understanding on how CEO
narcissism influences strategic actions and firm performance by examining behaviors with
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contrasting motivation: self-enhancement versus self-defense. By drawing from the process
model of narcissism to examine the multidimensionality of narcissism (Back et al., 2013), we
extend the existing literature on CEO narcissism by showing the differing behavioral paths
manifested by narcissistic CEOs can then have different impacts onto firm performance. This is
especially important because CEOs can have considerable influence over firm performance
(Quigley and Graffin, 2017; Quigley and Hambrick, 2015), so unpacking how CEO narcissism
influences firm decisions can better inform boards of directors on factors to incorporate into their
monitoring process.
Second, we advance prior upper echelon literature by unpacking the two new
mechanisms associated with these behavioral strategies – approach motivation and TMT
minimization threat – to link CEO narcissism to firm performance. For complex personality
traits like narcissism which can generate contradictory behaviors, testing these theoretical
mechanisms (i.e. mediators) becomes critical to parse out how the trait can translate to both
positive or negative effects (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017). Our research offers paths to
understanding, for instance, whether the narcissistic CEO that engages in corporate social
responsibility (Petrenko et al., 2016, Gupta & Misangyi, 2018) is the same CEO that generates
greater misconduct (Capalbo et al., 2018; Scotter & Roglio, 2018). As a result, we contribute to
past efforts made to distinguish between the “bright” and the “dark” side of CEO narcissism.
Last, while the personality psychology literature has documented the complex effect of
narcissism on the establishment of social relationships, we offer to the best of our knowledge one
of the first empirical tests examining this effect for narcissistic CEOs.
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Theory Development And Hypotheses
Narcissism as a Dynamic Self-Regulatory Process Model
In personality psychology, research on narcissism has created a wide set of study
evidence in which the associations between narcissism and intra-and-interpersonal outcomes are
paradoxical (Back et al., 2013; Krizan & Herlache, 2018; Miller et al., 2017; Morf et al., 2011).
For instance, in multiple experiments on how narcissism affects popularity in short-term
acquaintance, Küfner et al. (2013) found two opposing behavioral domain paths by which
narcissism influenced popularity. On the one hand, narcissism was positively associated with
assertive behaviors such as behaving expressively and dominantly that in turn, led to positive
perceptions. On the other hand, narcissism was also positively associated with aggressive
behaviors such as combativeness and arrogance, that then triggered negative perceptions.
Ultimately, the two effects then cancel each other out creating no association overall. Thus,
while narcissists’ self-assuredness and charisma can make narcissistic individuals fascinate
others and help them emerge as leaders, a constant pursuit of admiration, aggressiveness, and a
lack of empathy can also turn people away from them (Back et al., 2013; Morf et al., 2011). To
organize these both intra-and- interpersonal paradoxes, scholars have argued for narcissism to be
understood as a dynamic self-regulatory process in which this narcissism multidimensionality is
expected to result in different social processes to maintain the self (Back et al., 2013, Morf et al.,
2011).
As a dynamic self-regulatory process, personality is a consequence of the efforts
employed by individuals to construct, maintain, defend, and improve their desired self-views
(Morf, 2006, Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001, Morf et al., 2011). Self-regulatory processes, then,
encompasses all strategies, tactics, mechanisms, and processes performed by individuals to
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regulate and shape their self-image (Morf et al., 2011). For narcissists, the core goal of a selfregulatory process is to achieve and maintain a grandiose self (Back et al., 2013, Kernberg,
1975). Back et al. (2013) then proposed that narcissists could pursue this end via two different
self-regulatory processes with distinct affective-motivational, cognitive, and behavioral
pathways: narcissism admiration and narcissism rivalry.
In this perspective, then, people differ not only in their degree of overall narcissism, but
also in the processes they activate - admiration or rivalry - to reach the grandiose self (Back et
al., 2013). These two dimensions have been widely researched, and systematically associated
with different and contrasting intra and interpersonal outcomes (Fatfouta et al. 2018; Geukes et
al., 2017; Helfrich & Dietl, 2019; Lange et al., 2016; Lee et al., 2014; Wurst et al., 2017; ZeiglerHill et al., 2019). In the next sections we build on this dynamic self-regulatory process model of
narcissism to develop the implications of admiration and rivalry processes to firm performance.
CEO Narcissism, Narcissism Admiration And Firm Performance
The strategy literature on CEO narcissism, thus far, has relied on narcissistic individuals’
need for attention and praise, and higher self-evaluations, to explain the expected and found
effects of CEO narcissism on firm performance and strategic actions (Cragun et al., 2020). This
theoretical focus aligns with the description of the narcissism admiration process, which centers
on self-enhancement efforts to feel good about oneself, and admired and special by others (Back
et al., 2013). Specifically, the narcissism admiration path is a self-promotion strategy that seeks
to achieve desired social outcomes such as status, praise, attractiveness, success, and social
interest. Because narcissism admiration activates an optimistic seeking of one’s uniqueness and
thoughts about one’s own grandiosity, it leads to self-assured and expressive behaviors (Back et
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al., 2013). Consequently, we argue that narcissism admiration behaviors are likely positively
associated with firm performance.
Specifically, we focus on the approach motivation as an expression of the narcissism
admiration processes. The approach motivation theory distinguishes individual behaviors based
on preferences for seeking rewards or for avoiding punishments (Elliot, 2008). More precisely,
Elliot (2008: 3) defines the approach motivation as “the energization of behavior by, or the
direction of behavior toward, positive stimuli (objects, events, possibilities),” and avoidance
motivation as “the energization of behavior by, or the direction of behavior away from, negative
stimuli (objects, events, possibilities).” Scholars have argued that approach motivation
narcissism is related to approach motivations in a broad range of contexts (Foster & Brennan,
2011), as an approach motivation in narcissistic individuals is associated with thoughts of a
grandiose self, a need for attention, and charming behaviors (Foster & Trimm, 2008). For
instance, in an experiment about investment options, Foster et al. (2009) found that the approach
motivation mediated the relationship between narcissism and aggressive investment strategies;
individuals with higher levels of narcissism had a higher focus on the potential gains, which in
turn led to the selection of aggressive investment strategies.
Moving to the strategy context, scholars have made similar arguments, e.g., that
narcissistic CEOs engage in more mergers and acquisitions because they weigh as more the
potential benefits from the M&A (Chatterjee & Hamrick, 2007). In line with this CEO
narcissism argument, Gamache et al. (2015) proposed and found support to the proposition that
CEOs with a higher approach motivation engaged in more merger and acquisition deals, and in
higher value deals. With a similar argument, Patel and Cooper (2014) proposed that the approach
motivation was a central mechanism linking CEO narcissism and firm performance. In
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particular, they argued that after a crisis period, narcissistic CEOs are more prone to take the
actions to enhance firm performance because of their focus on the rewards of those actions.
Furthermore, by focusing on what they can gain from starting an action, narcissistic CEOs also
set up their firm to achieve better performance and a quicker recovery than firms led by nonnarcissistic CEOs. Following these arguments, we propose that:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The approach motivation will positively mediate the relationship
between the degree of CEO narcissism and firm performance.
CEO Narcissism, Narcissism Rivalry, And Firm Performance
In contrast to narcissism admiration, narcissism rivalry has seldom been the focus of
CEO narcissism studies (Cragun et al., 2020; Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017) as it involves
behavioral strategies of devaluing others and maintaining supremacy in interpersonal relations.
Narcissism rivalry revolves around the protective efforts pursued to defend a grandiose self from
attacks, real or imagined, by others. The self-defense strategy of narcissism rivalry thus triggers a
motivation to reinstate and defend one’s own superior status by devaluing others and by
reinforcing one’s supremacy, especially when compared to perceived social rivals (Back et al.,
2013). In contrast to the praise-seeking behaviors in narcissism admiration, narcissism rivalry
entails hostile, annoyed, and socially intensive behaviors. Such conduct is usually perceived by
outsiders as offensive, and over time will affect the quality of inter-personal relationships,
generating responses such as rejection, relational transgressions, unpopularity, criticism, and a
lack of trust from others. These outcomes, in turn, will likely reinforce the narcissist’s negative
view of the generalized other, and the need to prevail over rivals in order to minimize the ego
threat (Back et al., 2013). Thus, we argue that narcissism rivalry behaviors are negatively
associated with firm performance, as they are likely to impact the relationships between the CEO
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and other top management team members (here, those executives above the vice-president level
(e.g. CEO, COO, CFO) as well as vice-presidents) (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).
Scholars have identified CEOs as a predominant driver of top management team
dynamics and effectiveness (Simsek et al., 2005). Carmeli et al. (2011), for instance, found that
CEO empowering leadership is positively associated with the top management team behavioral
integration, i.e., how well members collaborate, exchange information and make joint decisions
(Hambrick, 1994). Likewise, Ou et al. (2014) found that humble CEOs can spark positive
integration not only among top management team members, but also among middle level
managers. Indeed, CEO narcissism itself has been linked to top management team dynamics.
Examining the impact of narcissism on TMT behavioral integration in a sample of 97 firms in
the computer hardware and software industry, Reina et al. (2014) found that narcissist CEOs
with high organizational identification actually had a positive relationship with TMT behavioral
integration, because these CEOs perceived the organization success as a reflection of their own
success, and were open and interested in promoting a functional and effective TMT dynamics.
Given the motivation and behaviors associated with narcissism rivalry, though, we argue
that rivalry behaviors entail a very unique top management team dynamic, which we call TMT
threat minimization. Narcissistic CEOs with a higher rivalry orientation perceive other
executives as rivals seeking to gain their position and power. To minimize the (perceived) threat
from the internal managerial labor market, narcissistic CEOs may promote TMT turnover to
replace more experienced or inquisitive/challenging executives by those who will be perceived
as lower threat. Indeed, Zeigler-Hill et al. (2019) found that narcissism rivalry individuals
employ predominantly dominance strategies to attain and maintain status. Dominance strategies
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are based on intimidation and fear as well as the use of hierarchy to maintain their status and
power (Anderson et al., 2015; Cheng et al., 2013).
Therefore, TMT threat minimization, by promoting TMT turnover, is likely to lead to
TMT management dysfunction. First, it may suppress the contribution of the top management
team because the CEO becomes not only the most experienced – and powerful – in the team, but
also serves as a mentor (at least a perceived mentor) to new executives who may mimic these
behaviors. Second, it may engender situations in which decision-making gravitates around the
CEO’s reigning opinion, and the executives become increasingly deferential to the CEO’s
command to avoid the offensive behaviors. The consequent of lack of checks from more
experienced or inquisitive/challenging executives will in turn lower the quality of the decisionmaking process, making it more susceptible to bias such as groupthink. Research has well
established that dysfunctions in TMT management are associated with lower firm performance
(e.g., Carmeli et al., 2011).
Moreover, the potential for generating higher rates of TMT turnover itself is also
associated with lower firm performance, as it represents a loss of both experience and the stock
of tacit knowledge on how to manage the firm (Messersmith et al., 2014). Dysfunctional TMT
turnover can also alter the social networks within the firm, along with the associated social
capital with business partners and external stakeholders, which further increases friction due to
changes in the social structure of the firm (Cao et al. 2006, Dess & Shaw 2001, Messersmith et
al., 2014). Particularly, a large body of literature examines the negative effect of turnover on
performance at the group and organizational level (Hausknecht & Trevor, 2011; Hancock et al.,
2013). In one particularly relevant study covering 367 non-diversified firms, Messersmith et al.
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(2014) provided evidence that TMT turnover was negatively associated with subsequent firm
performance. Considering the above, we propose that:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): TMT turnover will negatively mediate the relationship between the
degree of CEO narcissism and firm performance.
Methods
Sample
To test our theoretical model, we used a sample of any firm that appeared in the S&P 500
from 2006 to 2019 to cover different market conditions and to have CEO turnover across several
different industries. We identified the new CEOs appointed during our timeframe and remained
in the position for at least three years because the narcissism index is calculated from data of the
second and third year of CEO tenure. Next, we collected and combined data from several
sources, including BoardEx, Compustat, SEC Edgar, firm annual reports, FD wire disclosure,
LexisNexis, and Backus et al. (2019)’s institutional investor data. Our final sample consists of
1805 CEO-years observations with 338 unique CEOs and 286 unique firms.
Variables
Dependent Variable
We measured firm performance using the return on assets (Chatterjee & Hambrick,
2007), which has long been used in the strategy literature (Combs et al., 2005). We selected
return on assets because it can better reflect the short- and long-term consequences of actions
taken by the narcissistic CEOs than market-based measures of firm performance such as total
return to shareholders and Tobin’s Q. While return on assets is strongly linked to firm actions,
market-based measures are more sensitive to third-party (e.g., analysts, institutional investors,
and retail investors), evaluations of those actions, as well as cyclical market vagaries. Moreover,
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there is a large body of literature showing that executive traits and impression management
tactics can influence these third-party evaluations (Petrenko et al., 2019), and thus by focusing
on return on assets, we seek to minimize the impact of these confounding factors in our analysis.
Mediators
To measure the CEO’s approach motivation consistent with narcissism admiration, we
created a CEO approach motivation index. The index employed the dictionary that was created
and validated by Gamache et al. (2015). Gamache et al. (2015) developed a dictionary of words
representing “promotion versus prevention foci” to capture CEOs’ regulatory focus. They
derived the dictionary from words used in self-reported measures of regulatory focus, and
validated the words with a panel of experts and with a study of management undergraduate
students. Examples of approach motivation words include “accomplish,” “achieve,”
“advancement,” “aspiration,” “attain,” “desire,” “earn,” “gain,” and “grow”(Gamache et al.,
2015). We then pulled transcripts of earning calls and other meeting presentations to analyze
CEO language, which were retrieved from the FD Wire Disclosure in the LexisNexis database.
We selected this source over the letter to shareholders, which is often composed and/or polished
by the firm’s public relations staff. Following Gamache et al. (2015), we calculated our CEOs’
approach motivation index by dividing the total number of approach motivation words by the
total number of words.
To measure the CEO’s threat minimization consistent with narcissism rivalry, we
employed the proxy measure of TMT turnover. To calculate turnover, we combined data from
inside transactions (forms 3, 4, and 5) and proxy statements (form DEF-14A) that are reported
and available in the SEC Edgar database. First, we used the inside transactions to identify the top
management team executives. United States federal law demands that all senior officers who are
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“directors, executive officer, investor relations or any public relations officer, or those person
with similar functions” (SEC, n.d.), as well as all those that hold more than a 10% ownership in
the firm to report their purchases, sales, and holdings of the firm as they act as a firm “insider”
with the potential for proprietary access to vital financial information. Thus, when individuals
are hired as an officer or director for instance, they are required to report their ownership and this
reporting requirement remains through their entire tenure.
We retrieved all inside transaction filings associated with the firms in our sample from
the SEC Edgar and identified all executives with the title of vice-president and above (e.g., CEO,
CFO, President, Executive President, Vice President). After identifying the start (form 3 or first
form 4) and end (last form 4) of the tenure of the executives, we created a list of top management
team members for every year. Second, we then used the proxy statements to identify the five
executives (four if not counting the CEO) earning the highest compensation. We considered the
compensation as the best indication, albeit imperfect, of the power possessed by executives
(Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002). Third, we calculated the TMT turnover as the
percentage of powerful executives of the previous year that left the firm, i.e., are not in the list of
top management team members in the focal year.
Independent Variable
We measured CEO narcissism using the operationalization developed and validated by
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) and refined by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2011). The CEO
narcissism index is composed of four indicators and widely employed in the strategy literature
(Cragun et al., 2020). First, the prominence of the CEO’s photograph in the company’s annual
report is a four-point scale in which four points indicates the CEO’s photo was of him or her
alone and occupied more than half a page; three points indicates the photo was of the CEO alone
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and occupied less than half a page; two points indicates the CEO was photographed with one or
more fellow executives; and one point indicates there was no photograph of the CEO. Second,
the CEO prominence in company press releases is calculated as the number of times the CEO
was mentioned by name in the press release divided by the number of words. Third, the relative
cash pay is the CEO’s cash compensation (salary and bonus) divided by that of the secondhighest-paid executive in the firm. Lastly, our fourth indicator is the relative non-cash pay, that
is, the CEO’s non-cash compensation (deferred income, stock and options grants) divided by that
of the second-highest-paid executive in the firm.
To calculate these indicators, we employed the scores from the second and third year of
tenure to minimize problems regarding the succession between CEOs (Chatterjee & Hambrick,
2007). After standardizing each indicator, we averaged the above four indicators to create a CEO
narcissism index. We assessed the reliability of our measure of CEO narcissism by performing a
confirmatory factor analysis in which the measurement model has one latent variable influencing
in indicators outlined above. The measurement model displayed goodness fit of indices (CFI =
.98, TLI = .98, RMSEA = 0.043, SRMR = 0.033) above the recommend in the literature (Kline,
2015).
Control Variables
We included several CEO, Board, and firm control variables. At the CEO level, we
controlled for CEO age and gender, (one indicating female CEO), as both variables are
associated with narcissism. We also included a dummy variable indicating whether the CEO was
promoted from inside the firm, as external CEOs have been empirically linked to enacting more
organizational changes. Moreover, we controlled for CEO prevention motivation using the
measure developed by Gamache et al. (2015). Because CEOs can also differ in their actions
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given their power and tenure inside the organization, we controlled for CEO tenure (number of
years as CEO), and CEO duality (a dummy variable in which one indicates that the CEO also
holds the position of chair of the board of directors) (Krause et al., 2014), and CEO ownership,
(percent of stock owned by the CEO) (Kim & Lu, 2011).
Given that one role of board of directors is monitoring firm executives, we controlled
board of director variables that may indicate different degrees of monitoring. First, we added the
ratio of independent directors to the full board, as these directors are theorized to provide better
supervision of CEO actions. Second, we controlled for the average director tenure as board
effectiveness may differ depending on their knowledge of firm activities and board procedures.
Last, we included average appointments, or the average number of boards that directors hold, as
it can proxy the workload of directors and their capability to oversee CEO activities.
At the firm level, we controlled for financial slack, (the ratio of current assets to current
liabilities), to account for differences based on immediate resource availability. We included firm
size as the log of firm revenues, as CEO narcissism has been associated with larger firms
(Cragun et al. 2020). Moreover, we controlled for firm performance in the year prior to the CEO
appointment to account for inertial tendencies regarding firm performance (Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2007). We also added TMT size, the total number of executives with a title of vicepresident and above as larger teams may display higher rates of turnover, and the percentage of
institutional ownership as institutional owners are associated with higher monitoring of firm
actions. Last, we also controlled for industry using two-digit SIC dummy variables, and year
dummies to account for possible time trends.
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Estimation Procedures
We used structural equation modeling (SEM) as we are interested in estimating indirect
effects, which imply performing a mediation analysis. This is the recommended approach to test
mediated relationships with divergent pathways (Zhao et al., 2010). Stated differently,
employing SEM allowed us to test the mediated effect of approach motivation (H1) and TMT
threat minimization (H2) on firm performance. In addition, compared to running three separate
equations, SEM allows control over measurement errors that might lead to under- or
overestimation of mediation effects (Shaver, 2005). We tested our hypotheses (H1 and H2) by
examining the joint significance of the relationship between independent and mediating
variables, and then mediating and dependent variable (Kenny et al., 1998). Specifically, we used
nonparametric bootstrapping with 1,500 replications to adjust the estimates for bias and to
estimate the mediated effects, their standard errors, and their confidence intervals (Mooney &
Duval, 1993; Hayes, 2009). This procedure is also in line with the estimation of mediated effects
in strategy research (Moeen, 2017; Naumovska et al., 2011; Kaplan & Vakili, 2015). Last, to
minimize concerns of reverse causality, we allowed temporal precedence among independent,
mediators, and dependent variables.
Correction for Self-selection Endogeneity
It is likely that narcissistic CEO are attracted to certain conditions and situations that
allow them to demonstrate their narcissistic tendencies. Therefore, following the previous
literature (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011; Petrenko et al., 2016), we addressed the potential
for self-selection bias by first regressing CEO narcissism against a set of antecedent and
contemporaneous variables.
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To capture CEO’s entry conditions, we included firm size and firm performance in the
year prior to the appointment of the CEO. Likewise, we introduced firm performance change in
the first year of CEO tenure to account for the possibility that early improvements might
stimulate narcissistic tendencies (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Petrenko et al., 2016).
Additionally, we included CEO duality, CEO ownership, and board independence measured in
the first year of the CEO to account for CEO power, and a dummy variable indicating whether
the CEO was an insider (promoted from within firm). Last, to account for the possibility that
narcissistic CEOs are drawn to specific industries and potential time trends in their appointments,
we included two-digit SIC dummies and year dummies. We then created a predicted a narcissism
score based on this model, and included it as an endogeneity control in our models.
Results
Table 6 displays the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of our variables. On
average, the return on assets was 0.059, the turnover ratio was 0.046, and the promotion
motivation was 0.006. CEO narcissism correlates positively with promotion motivation (0.151)
and positively with TMT turnover (0.049). All correlations are below 0.50, indicating no
multicollinearity problem (Kennedy, 2008).
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Table 6 Correlations and descriptive statistics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Firm Performance
TMT Turnover
CEO Approach Motivation
CEO Narcissism
CEO Prevention Motivation
CEO Age
CEO Tenure
CEO Duality
CEO Ownership
Internal CEO
CEO Gender
Independent Directors
Average Director Tenure
Average Board Seats
Past Firm Performance
Firm Size
Institutional Ownership
Financial Leverage
TMT Size
Narcissism End. Control

Mean
0.06
0.05
0.01
0.03
0.00
56.25
2.79
0.43
0.00
0.76
0.05
0.80
8.09
2.10
0.06
9.02
0.81
1374.88
10.27
0.01

SD
0.08
0.08
0.00
0.54
0.00
5.33
2.35
0.50
0.02
0.42
0.22
0.11
2.92
0.47
0.12
1.21
0.15
28050.16
3.93
0.30

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

-0.06
0.13
0.07
-0.07
0.00
0.04
-0.01
0.00
0.09
0.06
-0.03
0.06
0.01
0.19
0.16
-0.07
0.04
0.11
0.06

0.02
0.05
-0.02
-0.02
-0.11
-0.03
0.03
-0.07
-0.01
0.02
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
-0.02
0.00
0.04
-0.22
0.01

0.15
-0.13
-0.05
0.00
0.04
-0.05
0.04
0.03
0.08
0.07
0.02
0.05
0.05
-0.10
0.01
0.11
0.19

-0.04
0.09
-0.01
0.29
0.03
0.08
0.10
0.16
-0.06
0.00
0.09
0.13
-0.19
0.00
0.13
0.51

0.07
-0.07
0.05
0.00
-0.01
0.01
0.11
-0.07
0.12
-0.05
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
0.01
0.02

0.29
0.29
0.20
-0.15
0.05
0.14
0.09
0.04
-0.01
0.12
-0.07
-0.02
0.01
0.17

0.14
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.05
0.19
-0.09
-0.01
0.02
0.09
-0.03
-0.02
-0.05

0.03
0.02
-0.07
0.42
-0.08
0.06
-0.02
0.21
-0.23
-0.02
0.08
0.39

-0.16
-0.03
-0.11
-0.02
-0.03
0.02
0.02
-0.10
-0.01
-0.06
0.03

0.02
0.26
0.27
-0.07
0.04
0.18
-0.05
0.02
0.06
0.11

0.09
-0.03
0.05
0.06
0.17
-0.09
-0.01
0.11
0.07

-0.03
0.07
0.06
0.21
-0.13
0.01
0.08
0.24

-0.19
-0.03
-0.09
0.11
0.00
-0.10
-0.01

Table 6 continued
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Average Board Seats
Past Firm Performance
Firm Size
Institutional Ownership
Financial Leverage
TMT Size
Narcissism End. Control

14

15

16

17

18

19

-0.07
0.17
-0.12
0.02
0.04
0.06

0.17
-0.11
0.02
0.08
0.18

-0.30
0.03
0.29
0.24

0.01
-0.25
-0.30

-0.01
0.01

0.19
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Table 7 Results of SEM analysis of CEO narcissism, mediating variables, and firm
Performance
A
CEO
Approach
Motivation
TMT Turnover
CEO Approach
Motivation
CEO Narcissism
CEO Prevention
Motivation
CEO Age

1
B

C

TMT
Turnover

Firm
Performance

A
CEO
Approach
Motivation

2
B

C

TMT
Turnover

Firm
Performance
-0.038(0.022)
1.283(0.734)

0.001(0.000)

0.012(0.005)

0.007(0.005)

-0.398(0.096)

-2.985(1.670)

-3.963(1.757)

-0.386(0.112)

-2.358(1.776)

-2.950(1.747)

0.000(0.000)

0.000(0.000)

0.000(0.001)

0.000(0.000)

0.000(0.000)

0.000(0.001)

CEO Tenure

0.000(0.000)

-0.004(0.001)

0.000(0.001)

0.000(0.000)

-0.004(0.001)

0.000(0.001)

CEO Duality

0.000(0.000)

-0.005(0.005)

0.002(0.007)

0.000(0.000)

-0.009(0.005)

0.001(0.008)

CEO Ownership

-0.006(0.003)

0.000(0.088)

0.029(0.050)

-0.006(0.003)

-0.024(0.097)

0.031(0.049)

Internal CEO

0.000(0.000)

-0.017(0.006)

0.012(0.008)

0.000(0.000)

-0.020(0.006)

0.010(0.008)

CEO Gender

-0.001(0.000)

0.002(0.008)

-0.002(0.008)

-0.001(0.000)

-0.003(0.008)

-0.003(0.009)

Independent Directors
Average Director
Tenure
Average Board Seats

0.002(0.001)

0.046(0.017)

-0.061(0.032)

0.003(0.001)

0.056(0.017)

-0.053(0.034)

0.000(0.000)

0.000(0.001)

0.001(0.001)

0.000(0.000)

0.000(0.001)

0.001(0.001)

0.000(0.000)

-0.009(0.005)

0.002(0.006)

0.000(0.000)

-0.009(0.005)

0.001(0.006)

TMT Size
Past Firm
Performance
Firm Size
Institutional
Ownership
Financial Leverage
Narcissism End.
Control
Industry fixed effect

0.000(0.000)

-0.006(0.001)

0.000(0.001)

0.000(0.000)

-0.006(0.001)

0.000(0.001)

0.000(0.001)

-0.013(0.014)

0.080(0.058)

0.000(0.001)

-0.014(0.013)

0.076(0.056)

0.000(0.000)

0.006(0.002)

0.008(0.005)

0.000(0.000)

0.007(0.002)

0.008(0.005)

0.000(0.001)

-0.011(0.017)

-0.003(0.022)

-0.001(0.001)

-0.011(0.017)

-0.004(0.023)

0.000(0.000)

0.000(0.000)

0.000(0.000)

0.000(0.000)

0.000(0.000)

0.000(0.000)

0.001(0.001)

0.002(0.015)

0.009(0.018)

0.001(0.001)

-0.002(0.016)

0.009(0.019)

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

0.002(0.002)

0.058(0.045)

-0.048(0.071)

0.001(0.002)

0.035(0.044)

-0.058(0.076)

Year fixed effect
Constant
Cov(TMT Turnover*
CEO Approach
Motivation)

0.000(0.000)

0.000(0.000)

Log-pseudolikelihood
12968.493
Clustered standard error in parenthesis; n = 1805 CEO-year observations
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12417.469

Table 7 reports our results of the GSEM analyses for firm performance. Each model consists
of three submodels: A, B, and C. In Submodel A, the dependent variable is approach motivation; in
Submodel B the dependent variable is TMT turnover; and in Submodel C the dependent variable is
firm performance. Model 1 has only the control variables, and model 2 includes CEO narcissism. An
assumption in mediation effects is that the independent variable, CEO narcissism, affects the
mediating variables, (CEO approach motivation index and TMT turnover). Model 2A shows that
CEO narcissism is positively and statistically associated with approach motivation (β = 0.001; p <
.001). The increase of one standard deviation in CEO narcissism is related to 0.0005 increase in the
CEO approach motivation, which represents 17% of the standard deviation of CEO approach
motivation. Model 2B displays that CEO narcissism is positively and statistically associated with
TMT turnover (β = 0.013; p = .006) such that the increase of one standard deviation in CEO
narcissism is related to 0.007 increase in the TMT turnover ratio, which represents 8% of the
standard deviation of TMT turnover.
Model 2C presents the effects of CEO narcissism and the two mediating variables – approach
motivation index and TMT turnover – on firm performance. The direct effect of CEO narcissism on
firm performance was positive, but not statistically significant (β = 0.007; p = .196). Approach
motivation was positively related to firm performance (β = 1.283; p = .080); the increase of one
standard deviation of approach motivation is associated with 0.004 increase in firm performance.
TMT turnover, in contrast, was negatively related to firm performance (β = -0.038; p = .074); the
increase of one standard deviation of TMT turnover is associated with -0.003 decrease in firm
performance.
Table 8 summarizes our results from bootstrap analysis of the indirect effects. H1, which
predicts that approach motivation would positively mediate the relationship between CEO
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narcissism and firm performance, was supported as the indirect effect is positive (β = 0.003) and the
95% confidence interval does include zero (0.002, 0.004). H2, which predicts that TMT turnover
would negatively mediate the relationship between CEO narcissism and firm performance, was also
supported as the indirect relationship was negative (β = -0.001) and the 95% confidence interval
does include zero (-0.001, -0.0005).
Table 8 Indirect effects
95% CI LL

95% CI UL

-0.001

-0.0005

CEO Narcissism* CEO Approach Motivation 0.003
0.002
Note: Bias-corrected confidence interval from 1,500 replications

0.004

CEO Narcissism *TMT Turnover

-0.001

Discussion
Our primary goal in this study was to extend the literature on CEO narcissism, and Upper
Echelons more broadly, by theorizing and testing why CEO narcissism can relate to opposite
outcomes, in our case positive and negative firm performance. Building off of the personality
psychology literature, we showed that the behavioral strategies employed by narcissistic CEOs
matters for firm performance. Specifically, we showed that whereas narcissistic CEOs have a
positive effect on firm performance through their employment of an approach motivation, i.e., the
narcissism admiration path, they also have a negative effect on firm performance through TMT
threat minimization reflected in turnover, the narcissism rivalry path. Taken together, our findings
provide important implications for research on CEO narcissism and Upper Echelons theory.
First, our findings highlight that the multi-dimensionality of the narcissism trait matters for
firm performance and likely strategic outcomes. Scholars in personality psychology have shown that
narcissist individuals can behave differently and be associated with different life outcomes because
of differences in dimensions of their narcissism profile (e.g., high leadership/authority – low
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entitlement versus low leadership/authority – high entitlement) (Back et al., 2013; Morf et al., 2011).
Our results extend these finds into the strategy literature. By bringing together upper echelons and
narcissism admiration-rivalry theory, we explicated why narcissistic CEOs seem unrelated to firm
performance.
Strategy scholars have highlighted the importance of examining the micro-foundations of
important strategic issues and delving into the mechanisms to advance the field moving forward
(Devinney, 2013; Busenbark et al., 2016; Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017; Liu et al., 2018). Our
explication shows that personality traits, narcissism in our case, can lead to behaviors that cancel out
each other’s effects, thus diminishing our understanding of how traits impact strategy. Future
research should then, pursue not only whether a personality trait, a value, or even experience of the
CEO is important to an outcome, but also how it might materialize in practice.
Second, our results reinforce the necessity for a nuanced and fine-grained theorization of how
personality traits correlate to firm performance as well as strategic outcomes (Busenbark et al, 2016;
Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017; Liu et al., 2018). Our findings show that narcissistic admiration and
narcissistic rivalry have unique and contrasting effects on firm performance. As the current research
is comprised of equivocal findings, examining the contrasting behaviors enacted by narcissistic
CEOs represents a promising venue for future studies to better depict and test the different pathways
by which narcissistic CEOs influence their firms. We encourage scholars to also examine the
theorized mechanisms using more mediation models such as we employed to unpack the different
effects that personality traits can have on firm outcomes. An alternative for CEO narcissism (and
other multi-dimensional personality traits) would be to pursue the development of measures to
capture the specific elements of the construct (e.g., leadership/authority, self-absorption/selfadmiration, superiority/arrogance, and exploitativeness/entitlement from Emmons, 1987).
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Third, our findings show that narcissistic CEOs can impact firms negatively not only by
placing wrong strategic “bets,” but also by depleting firm human resources and altering top
management team dynamics. Scholars in personality psychology have long argued that narcissistic
individuals can engender mixed feelings in interpersonal relationships, especially comparing short
and long-term relationships. Nevertheless, strategy research, with a few exceptions, has overlooked
the interface between narcissistic CEOs and the top management team members to focus on the
search for attention and self-assuredness. Cragun et al. (2020) have stressed the importance of
having control checks to mitigate the potential negative impact of narcissistic CEOs. Consequently,
as narcissism rivalry CEOs increase the turnover of more powerful members, this control check may
be actually targeted and minimized, potentializing the negative impact of a narcissistic CEO with
high rivalry.
Last, our study also has implications for management practice, especially for the board of
directors and other stakeholders interested in monitoring executive actions. Personality traits are an
important predictor of job performance, and therefore can be an important aspect of the selection
process. Because personality traits such as narcissism can lead to both positive and negative
behaviors, we encourage stakeholders – directors and external agents – to monitor executive
behaviors and develop control checks to minimize the occurrence of those negative behaviors such
as threat minimization, that hinder firm performance.
Limitations and Future Research
Several limitations should be noted in this current study. We relied on archival sources to
derive our measures of CEO narcissism and approach motivation. Although these measures were
validated previously and informed research in several different contexts, they are only partial and
therefore imperfect measure of these constructs. Importantly, we found significance even with the
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likelihood that our measures provide a conservative test of our theory. Future scholars should seek to
improve on our approach by surveying CEOs or individuals with firsthand experience of working
with them, perhaps using standard psychometric measures of narcissism and approach motivation.
Another alternative would be to triangulate archival measures from different sources such as
videometrics, and historiographic data. The results from our study, then, should be interpreted as
taking these limitations under consideration.
Also, there are several potential moderators that may influence the effect of CEO narcissism
on our mediating variables. For instance, CEO power and corporate governance quality may
influence the amount of managerial discretion of narcissistic CEOs in pursing their behavioral
strategies. While we did try to account for these factors, they may also work as boundary conditions
for the mediating effects. Future research, accordingly, could explore which, and how, factors
amplify or hinder the indirect effects of CEO narcissism on firm performance.
Conclusions
This study deepens our understanding of CEO narcissism, including why narcissistic CEOs
can be associated with positive and negative firm performance. Building on the narcissistic
admiration and rivalry theory, we develop and test a more nuanced elaboration of how behavioral
strategies employed by narcissistic CEOs have differential effects on firm performance. In doing so,
we provide a more fine-grained explanation of narcissistic CEOs’ behaviors.
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Chapter 3 Activism for whom? CEO Narcissism and Corporate Sociopolitical Activism
“We stay as far away from controversial issues as we possibly can… If we get involved
in a controversial issue we're going to be in trouble with 50 percent of the people who are
important to us.” Donald W. Larson, president of the 3M Foundation and director of
community affairs for the 3M Company (Jabocs, 1990)
“Our jobs as CEOs now include driving what we think is right… It’s not exactly political
activism, but it is action on issues beyond business.” Bank of America’s CEO, Brian
Moynihan (Langley, 2016)
Introduction
Sociopolitical issues such as same-sex marriage, immigration, and gun control evoke
strong feelings and reactions from group members who have their position challenged (HaiderMarkel & Meier, 1996; Stone, 2012). Thus, by performing corporate sociopolitical activism – i.e.
taking a stance on a contentious sociopolitical issue in order to weigh in on the issue and
influence opinions in the espoused direction (Nalick et al., 2016; Chatterji & Toffel, 2015) –
firms risk alienating a sizeable part of society. Indeed, research has shown that corporate
sociopolitical activism not only faces negative market reactions (Bhagwat et al., 2020) but also
leads to demotivating effects on employees (Burbano, 2021). Nevertheless, in the last decade, a
growing number of Chief Executive Officers (CEO) have moved their companies into the midst
of sociopolitical issues, challenging the once-default strategy of being quiet on issues lying
outside the firm’s core business domain (Chatterji & Toffel, 2018; Hambrick & Wowak, 2021).
Despite considerable advances to understand the consequences of corporate sociopolitical

61

activism, scholars have just started to unfold the role of why and when CEOs have decided to
engage in corporate sociopolitical activism (Nalick et al., 2016; Hambrick & Wowak, 2021).
The political ideology of the CEO, which includes the CEO’s interrelated set of attitudes
and values about the goals of society and how they should be achieved (Chin et al., 2013), has
been theorized to be an important factor motivating CEOs to engage in corporate sociopolitical
activism (Hambrick & Wowak, 2021; Chatterji & Toffel, 2019). While we concur that political
ideology plays a role in the direction of corporate sociopolitical activism, we argue that CEO
narcissism (i.e., the degree to which CEOs have inflated views of themselves and seek to have
those positive self-views continuously reinforced, Back et al., 2013; Campbell et al., 2004) offers
a compelling explanation of why CEOs would engage in corporate sociopolitical activism at all,
as it can be considered an opportunistic endeavor as it is not in accord with profit seeking
(Chatterji & Toffel, 2015) and holds the potential to turn off critical stakeholders: e.g.,
consumers (Hoewe & Hatemi, 2017; Lacker et al., 2018), employees (Burbano, 2021), and
market investors (Bhagwat et al., 2020) who are not aligned with the CEO’s position.
Researchers have shown that narcissistic CEOs will indeed engage in business practices
decoupled from firm performance. For instance, CSR initiatives performed by narcissistic CEOs
tend not to contribute to firm performance (Petrenko et al., 2016).
Therefore, to explain why and when narcissistic CEOs would engage in corporate
sociopolitical activism, we draw from the narcissism admiration literature in personality
psychology to theorize that a) the search for attention, b) the insensitivity to risks, and c) the
need to expose socially desirable identities (Back et al., 2013) make narcissistic CEOs more
likely than their non-narcissist peers to engage in corporate sociopolitical activism. Moreover,
we argue that the search for a celebrity status and the degree of public opposition to the social
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issue will serve as boundary conditions for this association. We tested our theoretical model
examining corporate sociopolitical activism in support of same-sex marriage from 2004-2015
with a random sample of 209 S&P 500 firms. We found support for our model showing that
narcissistic CEOs were more likely to engage in corporate sociopolitical activism, and both
seeking celebrity status and degree of public opposition strengthens the association.
Our study offers two major contributions. First, we contribute to the nascent literature on
corporate sociopolitical activism by explaining why CEOs may decide to take actions. By
integrating CEO narcissism as an antecedent for CEO activism, we offer support for the
opportunistic-driven motivation of CEOs. While a stakeholder-driven motivation could enhance
the firm-stakeholder relationship (Hambrick & Wowak, 2021), an opportunistic-driven
motivation may be seen as inauthentic, and thus worsen the relationship with stakeholders in the
long term. This contribution is important considering that the first empirical studies examining
the consequences of corporate sociopolitical activism have shown it as double-edge sword,
generating both positive and negative benefits for firms (Burbano, 2021; Chatterji & Toffel,
2019; Lacker et al., 2018). Thus, understanding the antecedents underlying corporate
sociopolitical activism can be critical to parse out its positive and negative effects.
Second, strategy scholars have highlighted findings showing that narcissistic CEOs may
engage in managerial opportunism through misusing firm resources with initiatives that are
questioned in regard to their contribution to firm operations (Petrenko et al., 2016). We extend
this stream in the narcissism literature in strategy by theorizing that the mechanisms that explain
why narcissistic CEOs may perform prosocial initiatives (e.g. activism and CSR), but with a
selfishness-motivation, which in turn may not produce any long term benefits for firms and
stakeholders.
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Theory Development
Corporate Sociopolitical Activism
Firms and CEOs acting to influence public policy is certainly not a new phenomenon, as
the corporate political activity literature has long documented how firms try to shape their
political environment with actions such as political donations, lobbying and grass root
movements (Hillman et al., 2004; Lux et al., 2011). Involvement in issues beyond the business
domain is also not new. CSR initiatives, for instance, involve pursuing a social good, often
beyond the immediate interests of the firm or that required by law, including activities such as
recycling, decreasing pollution, and supporting local businesses (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001).
What is new in the growing corporate sociopolitical activism trend is the rise in taking
stances on sociopolitical issues (Mayer, 2017). Sociopolitical issues are contentious issues in
which societal and institutional opinion splits into competing coalitions, derived often from
broader worldviews such as partisanship and religious beliefs (Nalick et al., 2016). The lack of
societal consensus around these issues creates groups of individuals and informal and formal
institutions “for” or “against” the issue (Nalick et al., 2016). Consequently, any position the firm
takes has the potential to alienate a large portion of the stakeholders (Mayer, 2017). Additionally,
sociopolitical issues evolve with public opinion, and institutions shift their positions on issues as
the discussions in the society unfolds, and debate evolves (Nalick et al., 2016). Importantly, the
complexity and the emotional load involved in sociopolitical issues make corporate
sociopolitical activism highly attractive for the media, which in turn makes such activism highly
visible to the stakeholders of firms (Hambrick & Wowak, 2021).
The limited evidence from empirical studies on the consequences of corporate
sociopolitical activism indicates that their ability to generate positive firm outcomes is not
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straightforward. In a field experiment examining the consequences of corporate sociopolitical
activism on consumers’ position and purchase intentions, Chatterji and Toffel (2017) found that
CEOs public stances indeed influenced the position of individuals towards the issue in the
espoused direction. Similarly, consumers aligned with the position espoused by the CEO showed
a greater intention to purchase a product from the firm. Interestingly, the study found that the
positive effect of corporate sociopolitical activism was present only when the name of the CEO
was visible. When a group of unnamed CEOs were used, they had no influence on individuals’
positions towards the issue.
In another study examining the effect of corporate sociopolitical activism on employee
motivation, Burbano (2021) found evidence of a demotivating effect for those employees who
disagree with the stance, and no motivating effect for employees who agree with it. This result
concurs to some degree with the survey results conducted by Lacker et al. (2018) in which
individuals were able to remember more often a product/service that they gave up of buying due
to the corporate sociopolitical activism, than of a product/service they bought due to it. And
finally in another examination of sociopolitical activism on stakeholders, Bhagwat et al. (2020)
examined a large sample of sociopolitical issues and found a negative market reaction following
the announcement of the corporate sociopolitical activism. Investors evaluated the sociopolitical
activism as a signal of a firm’s allocation of resources away from profit-oriented objectives. In
the next section, we develop a thesis of how CEO narcissism can be a driver of corporate
sociopolitical activism.
CEO Narcissism and Corporate Sociopolitical Activism
Because CEOs can affect the behaviors and outcomes of firms (Carpenter et al., 2004;
Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007), scholars have devoted considerable attention to
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understanding how executives’ personality traits, experience and personal values shape firm
behaviors and outcomes (Chin et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2016). Among the personality traits,
narcissism has been considered a predictor of several important outcomes such as mergers and
acquisitions (Chatterjee & Hamrick, 2007), international diversification (Gupta & Misangyi,
2018; Oesterle et al., 2016), and corporate social responsibility (Gupta & Misangyi, 2018;
Petrenko et al., 2016). We argue here that narcissistic CEOs may also act as an important
predictor of corporate sociopolitical activism, as they display behavioral tendencies of seeking
attention, emphasizing rewards over punishments, and symbolizing moral identity.
In personality psychology, though, narcissism is conceptualized as a complex personality
trait that has generated a paradoxical set of findings (Back et al., 2013; Krizan & Herlache, 2018;
Miller et al., 2017; Morf et al., 2011). To reconcile those findings, scholars have conceptualized
narcissism as a dynamic self-regulatory process in which the personality trait is a consequence of
the individuals’ efforts to construct, maintain, defend, and improve their desired self-view (Morf,
2006; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Morf et al., 2011). Thus for narcissists the core goal of the selfregulatory process is to achieve and maintain a grandiose self (Back et al., 2013, Kernberg,
1975).
Narcissistic individuals can achieve a grandiose self through two behavioral strategies:
narcissistic admiration and narcissistic rivalry. A narcissism admiration strategy involves selfenhancement efforts that will support feeling good about oneself and admired by others.
Narcissistic admiration is characterized by the optimistic seeking of one’s uniqueness and
thinking about one’s own grandiosity, and it is usually exhibited in self-assured, dominant, and
expressive behaviors. Narcissistic admiration allows narcissists to display their social dominance
and their interpersonal power, boosting their positive self-view (Back et al., 2013). Alternatively,
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narcissistic individuals may pursue a narcissistic rivalry strategy; this tendency invokes selfdefense efforts to protect the self from others’ attacks (real or imagined). Narcissistic rivalry,
then, triggers the pursuit of reinstating and defending one’s own superior status by devaluing
others and by reinforcing one’s own supremacy (Back et al., 2013).
Considering the nature of CEO activism, we posit that the narcissistic admiration
behavior –with its emphasis on highly visible and risky self-enhancement efforts– drives the
relationship between CEO narcissism and corporate sociopolitical activism. Narcissistic
individuals constantly seek situations in which they can draw attention to themselves to reinforce
their grandiose self (Back et al., 2013; Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). Studies to date have
shown, for example, that narcissistic CEOs are more likely to become involved in risky strategies
such as high value mergers and acquisitions and the adoption of disruptive technologies, as both
these activities generate increased visibility to the CEO (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Gerstner
et al., 2013).
Narcissism admiration also entails a search for positive rewards, consistent with an
approach motivation (Foster & Brennan, 2011). Individuals with an approach motivation behave
in the direction of gaining positive stimuli; alternatively, individuals with an avoidance
motivation seek to avoid negative stimuli (Elliot, 2008). Narcissistic CEOs expressing an
approach motivation, then, are expected to give more weight to positive rewards coming from
corporate sociopolitical activism – e.g., public attention, praise from supporting stakeholders –
than they would to the negative ramifications – e.g., adverse market reactions, and dissatisfaction
from stakeholders with opposing positions. It is this focus on the positive rewards, according to
Patel and Cooper (2014), that also tends to lead narcissistic CEOs to outperform their non-
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narcissistic peers in the years after the 2008 financial crisis, as the narcissistic CEOs took on
more strategic actions to enhance firm performance.
Moreover, narcissistic individuals are selfish, and have little to no interest in other
individuals’ feelings and concerns (Back et al., 2013; Miller et al., 2017). Despite this, they can
still display prosocial behaviors (Brunell et al., 2014). For instance, Hart et al. (2018) showed
that narcissism is negatively related to altruistic behavior and moral identity internalization, but it
is positively related to “moral identity symbolization.” In other words, narcissistic individuals
will use symbolization to manipulate impressions for others by self-presenting socially-desirable
identities (e.g., moral, charming, kind), but, critically, those identities are not actually privately
held.
Thus, even when narcissism admiration entails a prosocial behavior, it is by definition in
a self-interested way (Gebauer et al., 2012; Brunell et al., 2014). Gebauer et al. (2012) showed
that narcissism can be value-oriented, such that narcissistic individuals’ “grandiose self” can be
justified as either agentic (e.g. “I am more capable than other people”) or communal (e.g. “I am
the most caring person in my social surrounding”). However, they posited that the communal
behaviors were in fact a manifestation of selfishness, rather than of altruism. Further research has
corroborated such arguments. Across three different studies, Konrath et al. (2016) found that
narcissism was negatively related to altruistic motives in prosocial behavior. In contrast, though,
narcissists displayed prosocial behavior in situations involving public visibility and social
rewards, and they had self-interested motives (e.g., a low focus on others’ needs). Konrath et al.
(2016) thus defended narcissists as acting as “strategic” helpers. Naderi (2018) found similar
results studying pro-environmental purchase decisions. Specifically, communal narcissistic
individuals claim to be pro-environmental, but they tend to behave in a pro-environmental way
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only when a) being pro-environment does not demand high degrees of self-sacrifice, b) the
consumption of a pro-environment product is highly visible to others, and c) the consumption of
a pro-environment product is attached to positive social feedback and to positive impressions in
their audience. In sum, we argue here that narcissistic CEOs are likely to engage in corporate
sociopolitical activism not because they believe it is the right thing to do, but because it serves as
a means to achieve their grandiose self.
Taken together we assert that narcissistic CEOs are drawn to corporate sociopolitical
activism as it represents an opportunity to draw public attention (Hambrick & Wowak, 2021) and
their approach motivation, in turn, makes them both more attracted to the benefits and more
insensitive to the potential risks of alienating a segment of stakeholders. Most importantly,
narcissistic CEOs will likely engage with corporate sociopolitical activism for selfish motives,
i.e. as a way to promote their grandiose self. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There will be a positive relationship between the degree of CEO
narcissism and corporate sociopolitical activism.
Moderating Role of CEO Celebrity
While the majority of CEOs remain unknown to the general public, some CEOs receive
so much coverage from the media that they not only become well-known to the general public
but also develop considerable social clout (Lovelace et al., 2021). CEO celebrity status, then,
represents the extent to which a CEO receives public attention with favorable emotional
responses from stakeholder audiences (Pollock et al., 2019; Rindova et al., 2006). These
celebrity CEOs are often created by the media, through portrayals in simplified narratives that
attribute firms’ actions and outcomes to the CEOs (Rindova et al., 2006). Notably, achieving a
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celebrity status is associated with higher compensation, visibility, and power (Pollock et al.,
2019; Lovelace et al., 2018).
Although most narcissistic CEOs desire public attention, they will differ widely in their
degree of CEO celebrity status. We make the assumption that those narcissistic CEOs with low
celebrity status are especially drawn to actions that would help them in their pursuit of greater
celebrity. Accordingly, narcissistic CEOs with a low celebrity status are more likely to pursue
corporate sociopolitical activism because doing so can draw the wanted attention from the media
and general public to their deviant and risky actions (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017; Young &
Pinsky, 2006). On the other hand, narcissistic CEOs with a high celebrity status would have a
lower need to engage in corporate sociopolitical activism, as greater publicity is of less value and
benefit. Therefore, we hypothesize that
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The level of celebrity status moderates the relationship between the
degree of CEO narcissism and corporate sociopolitical activism, such that low celebrity status
will strengthen the relationship between degree of CEO narcissism and corporate sociopolitical
activism.
Moderating Role of the Public Opinion Towards the Social Issue
Sociopolitical issues are constantly evolving such that an issue considered highly
controversial can become settled toward one direction (Nalick et al., 2016). Consequently, the
degree to which the corporate sociopolitical activism will stand out varies along the lifecycle of
the sociopolitical issue. At times of greater division and opposition, journalists and social actors
are more willing to broadcast and comment upon the corporate sociopolitical activism as they
perceive it as counter normative expectations and a very risky action (Hambrick & Wowak,
2021). Moreover, the level of controversy also influences the cognitive and emotional intensity
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with which stakeholders react to the action (Hambrick & Wowak, 2021). In contrast, when the
sociopolitical issues become settled and attract high societal support, the same corporate
sociopolitical activism will be perceived as bland and predictable, and consequently draw less
attention (Hambrick & Wowak, 2021).
We expect, then, that narcissistic CEOs will be more likely to engage in corporate
sociopolitical activism when an issue is highly divisive; considerable opposition should
exacerbate the potential benefits to be accrued by narcissistic CEOs in terms of media coverage,
public attention, and symbolic moral identity. On the other hand, as the issue becomes settled,
the incentives for narcissistic CEOs to engage in corporate sociopolitical activities will decrease.
Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The degree of opposition in the public opinion towards the
sociopolitical issue moderates the relationship between the degree of CEO narcissism and
corporate sociopolitical activism, such that higher degrees of opposition in public opinion
towards the issue strengthens the relationship between degree of CEO narcissism and corporate
sociopolitical activism.
Methods
Sample
To analyze the effect of CEO narcissism on corporate sociopolitical activism, we
examined the same-sex marriage debate that became highly controversial in the United States in
the last two decades, but displayed a changing level of public support over time (Haider-Markel,
2001). Specifically, in 2004, the year when Massachusetts was the first U.S. state to legalize
same-sex marriage, polls showed that the majority of U.S. respondents were opposed to samesex marriage, but, by 2014, the majority of U.S. respondents supported same-sex marriage
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(Kreitzer et al., 2014). In 2015, same-sex marriage became nationally recognized through a U.S.
Supreme Court decision.
To cover this evolution, we hand-collected data from press releases, articles on public
statements, and legal actions supporting same-sex marriage for a random subsample of 250 of
the 640 firms appearing in the S&P 500 at any point during our time period (2004–2015). The
smaller subsample made the onerous data collection manageable within our time frame. After
compilation we matched the sample to reports in Compustat, BoardEx, the Human Rights
Campaign, LexisNexis, BusinessWeek Bloomberg Magazine, USA Today, Audit Analytics, and
SEC Edgar database. After accounting for missing variables, our final sample consists of 209
firms, 384 CEOs, and 1,889 firm-year observations.
Variables
Dependent Variable
To measure corporate sociopolitical activism, we focused on CEO ad hoc or formal
declarations; a direct statement by the firm which could take the form of a public statement or
press release; or the filing of a legal document (e.g., amicus brief) in support of the issue (Nalick
et al., 2016). Although not all statements and legal filings include direct quotes from CEOs, there
is considerable evidence supporting the use of these statements. First, CEOs are actively
involved in reviewing external communications (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), and
communications we collect often highlight the involvement of the executive team and are
generally issued by an executive who reports directly to the CEO.
We focused on the first initial stance of corporate sociopolitical activism as it will stand
out more because of its counter normativity and riskiness (Hambrick & Wowak, 2021). As such,
corporate sociopolitical activity is measured as a dummy variable in which one indicates the first

72

year a CEO publicly supported same-sex marriage through a press release, ad hoc statement, or
an amicus (“friend of the court”) brief, and zero otherwise.
Independent Variable
We operationalized CEO narcissism using the narcissism index developed and validated
by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007; 2011). The CEO narcissism index is composed of four
indicators and widely employed in the strategy literature (Cragun et al., 2020). First, the
prominence of the CEO’s photograph in the company’s annual report is a four-point scale in
which four points indicates the CEO’s photo was of him or her alone and occupied more than
half a page; three points indicates the photo was of the CEO alone and occupied less than half a
page; two points indicates the CEO was photographed with one or more fellow executives; and
one point indicates there was no photograph of the CEO. Second, the CEO prominence in
company press releases is calculated as the number of times the CEO was mentioned by name in
the press release divided by the number of words. Third, the relative cash pay is the CEO’s cash
compensation (salary and bonus) divided by that of the second-highest-paid executive in the
firm. Lastly, our fourth indicator is the relative non-cash pay, that is, the CEO’s non-cash
compensation (deferred income, stock and options grants) divided by that of the second-highestpaid executive in the firm.
Given the nature of our dataset and our theorization of CEO narcissism as a dynamic selfregulatory process, we employed a moving average instead of using the second and third year of
tenure of CEOs (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). To do so, after standardizing each indicator, we
averaged the four indicators to create a “CEO narcissism index.” We assessed the reliability of
our measure of CEO narcissism by performing a confirmatory factor analysis in which the
measurement model has one latent variable influencing the indicators outlined above. The
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measurement model displayed goodness of fit indices (CFI = 1.00, RMSEA < 0.001, SRMR =
0.003) above that recommended in the literature (Kline, 2015); the latent factor explained 51% of
the variance in the four indicators.
Moderator Variables
Following Pollock et al.’s (2019) recommendation, we measured CEO celebrity by using
media coverage and positive valence, which indicate both visibility and positive tone
predominance. We selected BusinessWeek Bloomberg and USA today as media sources because
they are publications that “tend to publish feature articles, which are likely to contain the type of
dramatic narratives associated with the construction of celebrity” (Pfarrer et al., 2010). We
retrieved articles that matched the following criteria – the name of the CEO appeared at least
three times, and the word “CEO” and the firm name appeared at least one time – to minimize
false positives.
We, then, calculated two indicators. First, the volume of media attention was calculated
as the number of articles citing a CEO in a given year. Second, the positive valence, i.e., the
emotional resonance, of the attention paid to a CEO was measured by calculating the ratio of
positive affect content over the total affective content (sum of positive and negative affectivity)
for each article. Next, we applied the Janis-Fadner coefficient of imbalance to transform these
raw data into scores ranging from -1 to 1, in which -1 indicates the most negative coverage and
+1 indicates the highest positive coverage (Pfarrer et al., 2010).
Following Lovelace et al. (2021), we performed several transformations of each indicator
to derive the CEO celebrity score. First, we standardized by year each indicator to facilitate a
cross-year comparison. Second, we re-scaled them yearly by adding 0.01 and the absolute value
of the lowest score to make all values positive and different from zero. Third, we multiplied the
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score of the volume of media attention by the score of the positive valence to obtain our final
celebrity score. Because our interest was in narcissistic CEOs pursuing a greater celebrity score,
we multiplied the celebrity score by minus one so that higher scores indicate CEOs with lower
celebrity status.
We calculated national public opposition as the net value of the average percentage of
respondents that opposed same-sex marriage minus those that supported it in national polls.
These polls were conducted by Gallup, Pew Research Center, Ipsos, and Langer Research. The
average number of polls and sources for each year were seven and four, respectively, and the
average standard deviation was three percent.
Control variables
We included several control variables to account for potential alternative explanations
and confounding variables. First, we included CEO liberalism and organizational liberalism as
the literature has suggested that they are important factors for corporate sociopolitical activism
(Hambrick & Wowak, 2021). CEO liberalism and organizational liberalism were measured using
the indices developed by Chin et al. (2013) and Gupta et al. (2017) respectively. Both measures
are a composite of the following four indicators: a) total contributed to each party, b) number of
contributions to each party, c) number of donors to each party, and d) number of supported
candidates of each party. CEO liberalism uses campaign contributions only for CEOs, and
organizational liberalism uses the summed proportions of all employee campaign contributions
(excluding the CEO). Moreover, we controlled for CEO power with a formative index of four
variables: CEO duality, CEO’s relative ownership, the ratio of insider directors, and CEO tenure
(McDonald et al., 2008). Each indicator was standardized and summed. Last, we also included a
dummy variable indicating CEO succession events.
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At the firm-level, we also controlled for firm size, (total assets), and for firm
performance, (return on assets), as both factors can influence the likelihood of corporate
sociopolitical activism. Moreover, we included a dummy variable indicating whether the firm
provides domestic partnership benefits for employees.
Firms may also take a stance due to reputational pressures coming from specific
stakeholder groups. Given the specificity of our issue, we measure the firm’s reputation using the
Corporate Equality Index (CEI) published by the Human Rights Campaign. The CEI evaluates
the policies, practices, and benefits pertinent to the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer
(LGBTQ) employees (HRC, n.d.), which has been widely used for firms as positive signals
towards LGBTQ employees.
Additionally, we also controlled for potential pressures from activist investors by
measuring the percentage of institutional ownership that arose from activists, or signatories to the
Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI). To do so, we first matched the names of
institutional investor signatories of the PRI to the names of institutional investors in the SEC
Edgar database. Then, following Brav et al. (2015), Brav et al. (2008), and Shi et al. (2020), we
identified shareholder activism events using Schedule 13D and 13D/A amendments filings in
which owners need to indicate whether they have an interest in influencing the management of
the company. Next, using Audit Analytics, we identified which and when an institutional
investor signatory of PRI had filled a Schedule 13D stating their purpose: (a) concerns, (b)
disputes, or (c) control. All institutional investors that filled the 13D were coded as activist in the
subsequent year. After these two steps, identifying commitment to PRI and activist behavior, we
calculated the percentage of institutional ownership of activist investors committed to PRI. The
institutional ownership data was collected from Backus et al. (2019). Finally, we included federal
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liberalism – the proportion of Democratic (majority) control of the Presidency, U.S. Senate, and
U.S. House of Representatives (each body weighted equally) – as a control variable for federal
political climate.
Estimation Procedures
As our dependent variable is binary, we used logit models to test our hypotheses. We included
industry – two-digit open secrets, and firm fixed effects employing the within-between method.
In this method, variable variance is decomposed in two components – a group mean and a
deviation score. The group mean variable accounts for the time invariant endogeneity bias
(Allison, 2009; Certo et al., 2017; Antonakis et al., 2019). To analyze the interactions, we
followed Schunck’s (2013) recommendations to create the interaction term by multiplying the
variables first and then including its group mean in the estimation. Finally, we clustered standard
errors at the firm level to account for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation (Angrist &
Pischke, 2008).
Results
Table 9 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations for our variables. All correlations are
below 0.4 with the exception that firms with domestic partnership benefits have better firm
reputation (r = 0.78). This indicates no serious problems of multicollinearity (Kennedy, 2008).
Table 10 reports our results regarding corporate sociopolitical activism. Model 2 displays the
findings for hypothesis 1. H1 predicted that the degree of CEO narcissism is positively related to
corporate sociopolitical activism. Our findings provide strong support for this hypothesis as CEO
narcissism (β = 0.191, p = 0.030, AME β = 0.004, p = .037) is positively associated with
corporate sociopolitical activism. To interpret the effect size, we calculated the probability of
corporate sociopolitical activism at three levels of CEO narcissism: low (-1 SD), mean, and high
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(+ 1 SD). The probability of corporate sociopolitical activism at these values of CEO narcissism
was 2.1, 2.9, and 3.9%, respectively. This figure represents an 85.7[(3.9-2.1)/2.1] (34.5 [(3.92.9)/2.9]) percent increase in the likelihood of corporate sociopolitical activism for CEOs with a
high (+1 SD) degree of narcissism compared to CEOs with low (an average) degree of
narcissism.

78

Table 9 Correlations and descriptive statistics

Corporate Sociopolitical
1
Activism
2
CEO Narcissism
3
CEO Celebrity Status
4
Public Opposition
5
CEO Liberalism
6
Organizational Liberalism
7
CEO Power
8
Firm Size
9
Firm Performance
10
HRC Reputation
11
Domestic Partnership
Institutional PRI Activist
12
(%)
13
Federal Liberalism
14
CEO Succession
Note: N = 1,899

Mean

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

0.028

0.165

-0.053
-0.337
4.044
-0.003
-0.016
-0.066
20683.350
0.066
38.178
0.423

2.046
1.870
13.115
0.314
0.211
0.547
30231.560
0.075
40.761
0.494

-0.012
-0.133
-0.114
0.083
0.112
-0.010
0.158
0.014
0.207
0.179

0.017
0.046
-0.086
-0.057
0.088
-0.002
0.034
-0.017
-0.019

-0.060
-0.072
-0.114
-0.072
-0.094
-0.082
-0.155
-0.145

-0.012
-0.044
0.131
-0.068
0.053
-0.074
-0.162

0.352
-0.077
0.018
0.007
0.091
0.095

-0.033
0.024
0.041
0.179
0.202

0.044
0.045
0.026
0.053

-0.106
0.341
0.306

0.014
0.033

0.000

0.001

0.049

-0.013

0.009

-0.151

-0.007

-0.053

0.015

0.026

0.004

0.573
0.097

0.328
0.297

0.019
0.020

-0.026
-0.022

0.009
0.016

-0.333
0.004

0.029
0.041

0.048
-0.002

-0.094
-0.364

0.018
0.020

-0.064
-0.034

Table 9 Continued
10
10
11

HRC Reputation
Domestic Partnership
Institutional PRI Activist
12
(%)
13
Federal Liberalism
14
CEO Succession
Note: N = 1,899

11

12

13

0.047
-0.030

-0.027

0.783
0.049

0.055

0.064
0.037

0.063
0.021
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Table 10 Logit models predicting Corporate Sociopolitical Activism
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

CEO Narcissism

0.192(0.089)

0.249(0.086)

0.207(0.094)

CEO Celebrity Status

-0.044(0.041)

-0.076(0.058)

-0.037(0.041)

Public Opposition

-0.083(0.020)

-0.079(0.020)

-0.087(0.020)

CEO Narcissism* CEO Celebrity Status

0.065(0.028)

CEO Narcissism* Public Opposition

0.008(0.006)

CEO Liberalism

2.168(1.170)

1.201(1.148)

1.019(1.146)

1.465(1.100)

Organizational Liberalism

3.057(1.590)

2.075(1.544)

1.943(1.550)

1.960(1.549)

CEO Power

-0.251(0.404)

-0.020(0.496)

-0.006(0.495)

-0.021(0.507)

Firm Size

0.000(0.000)

0.000(0.000)

0.000(0.000)

0.000(0.000)

Firm Performance

-3.165(2.413)

-4.505(2.302)

-5.015(2.260)

-4.951(2.308)

HRC Reputation

0.031(0.016)

0.020(0.016)

0.024(0.016)

0.023(0.017)

Domestic Partnership

0.977(1.125)

0.411(1.229)

0.538(1.222)

0.642(1.406)

570.479(199.741)

441.586(198.039)

458.503(201.199)

502.778(216.450)

Federal Liberalism

0.222(0.456)

0.406(0.502)

-0.034(0.487)

0.580(0.522)

CEO Succession

0.452(0.489)

0.641(0.530)

0.589(0.549)

0.696(0.539)

Industry Fixed Effect

Included

Included

Included

Included

Firm Fixed Effect

Included

Included

Included

Included

-12.239(5.600)

-16.235(7.529)

-15.473(7.537)

-11.091(7.359)

-161.213

-149.487

-146.726

-146.785

0.33

0.38

0.39

0.39

Institutional PRI Activist (%)

Constant
Log pseudolikelihood
2

R
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis

As we outlined in H2, we expect that seeking celebrity status strengths the association
between CEO narcissism and corporate sociopolitical activism. Our results shown in Model 3
offer support to H2 as CEO celebrity status (β = .064, p = .021) positively moderates the effect of
CEO narcissism on corporate sociopolitical activism. Since interactions in logit models are
difficult to interpret (Hoetker, 2007), we graph this interaction in Figures 1. Consistent with our
theorization, narcissistic CEOs who have a lower CEO celebrity status (+ 1 SD) are more likely
to engage in corporate sociopolitical activism compared to those who have a higher CEO
celebrity status (-1 SD). Examining the marginal effect of this interaction, we found that CEOs
with a high degree of narcissism as approximately 1.13 times as likely to engage in corporate

80

sociopolitical activism in a given year when they have a lower CEO celebrity status (+1 SD)
compared to those who have a higher CEO celebrity status (-1 SD). Comparatively, CEOs with
low degree of narcissism is approximately .54 times as likely to engage in corporate
sociopolitical activism in a given year when they have a higher CEO (+1 SD) compared to those
who have a higher CEO celebrity status (-1 SD).

Figure 1: Interaction of CEO Narcissism and CEO Celebrity Status in predicting
Corporate Sociopolitical Activism
Model 4 presents our findings regarding H3, which predicts public opposition positively
moderates the relation between CEO narcissism and corporate sociopolitical activism. There is
no support for H4 as the interaction effect (β = .007, p = .161) is not statistically significant. We
return to this finding in our post hoc analysis.
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Post-hoc analyses
We did not find the moderating effect of public opposition. One potential explanation is
that the degree of the vividness of corporate sociopolitical activism is more of a qualitative
change (is vivid or not) and not reflected in incremental changes as we measured with the public
polls. To test this potential explanation, we performed a subsample analysis in which we divided
our sample in two periods. The first includes all years up to the first year in which the public
opposition becomes negative – i.e. there is more support than opposition (2004-2011). The
second includes all subsequent years (2012-2015).
Table 11 Subsample analysis predicting Corporate Sociopolitical Activism
Pre 2012

After 2012

Model 1

Model 2

CEO Narcissism

0.433(0.119)

-0.120(0.130)

Seeking Celebrity Status

-0.025(0.072)

-0.222(0.175)

CEO Liberalism

5.952(3.067)

-0.640(1.394)

Organizational Liberalism

6.749(3.503)

0.895(2.437)

CEO Power

-0.414(0.703)

0.126(0.610)

Firm Size

0.000(0.000)

0.000(0.000)

Firm Performance

-3.899(3.607)

-7.280(3.046)

HRC Reputation

0.035(0.037)

0.027(0.019)

Federal Liberalism

1.422(0.785)

-2.213(1.821)

CEO Succession

-0.527(1.199)

0.801(0.649)

Industry Fixed Effect

Included

Included

Firm Fixed Effect

Included

Included

-20.633(11.765)

-7.956(5.748)

-59.496

-78.702

0.421

0.391

Constant
Log pseudolikelihood
R

2

Sample Size
1,273
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 11 shows that the coefficient for CEO narcissism is positive and statistically
significant (β = .433, p < .001) in the period in which public opposition is positive, but it is (β = .120, p = .356) not when the same-sex marriage become more broadly accepted in society. A Z82

test assessing the difference between coefficient slope shows that they are indeed statistically
different (Z = 3.14, p = .001). In addition, we also examined whether there are interaction effects
between CEO narcissism and CEO liberalism (results are available upon request), and we found
no support for additional moderating effects.
Discussion
Our primary goal in this study was to extend the nascent literature on corporate
sociopolitical activism by explaining why and when narcissistic CEOs may be more willing to
engage in corporate sociopolitical activism. Building off of the personality psychology literature,
we theorized that narcissistic CEOs search for more attention, are more insensitive to risks, and
employ greater symbolic posturing of their moral identity – making them more likely to engage
in corporate sociopolitical activism. While the nascent literature has theorized that corporate
sociopolitical activism reflect value-driven actions (Hambrick & Wowak, 2021), our findings
suggest that, at least for narcissistic CEOs, corporate sociopolitical activism is likely to also have
an opportunistic motivation, as narcissistic CEOs who seek celebrity status are more likely to
engage in corporate sociopolitical activism. Taken together, our findings provide three important
implications for research on CEO narcissism and corporate sociopolitical activism.
First, we contribute to the growing literature on corporate sociopolitical activism, which
has dedicated attention toward the consequences of such activism (Burbano, 2021; Chatterji &
Toffel, 2019; Lacker et al., 2018), but has yet to understand the motivations – especially of CEOs
– to take stances on a variety of issues in the public sphere (Hambrick & Wowak, 2021).
Considering that corporate sociopolitical activism can be a double-edge sword, understanding the
motivation behind these phenomena is critical for untangling the positive and negative effects of
these actions. Our contribution to understanding this phenomenon includes an empirical
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examination of how contextual factors can signal that narcissistic CEOs are likely to engage in
corporate sociopolitical activism with a selfishness motivation. Our findings suggest that
although narcissistic CEOs may act as “activists” by promoting an issue before it is widely
accepted, they appear to be doing so to promote themselves.
Second, we extend the literature on CEO narcissism by theorizing how approach
motivation, selfishness, and moral identity signaling can explain why narcissistic CEOs engage
in corporate sociopolitical activism. Specifically, it extends the previous literature that has
focused the majority of its attention on self-assuredness and attention seeking in its examinations
of the effects of narcissistic CEOs on strategic outcomes. By bringing these new theoretical
mechanisms into view, our study helps to explain when and why narcissistic CEOs can engage in
activities decoupled from profit-seeking activities. Our findings corroborate the early evidence
that narcissistic CEOs can be more likely to misuse firm resources even though such misuse is
disguised in the form of legitimate firm actions (Petrenko et al., 2016). This finding offers the
important practical implications to directors and stakeholders that validates closer examination of
the rationale behind narcissistic CEOs actions in this arena.
Last, our findings highlight the importance of contextual factors in untangling the CEO
narcissism mechanisms and ensuing motivations to pursue specific strategic actions. For
instance, narcissistic CEOs seeking celebrity status are more likely to engage in corporate
sociopolitical activism than those who already possess a celebrity status. The selfishness attached
to such an action may impose constraints to the ability of the firm in building a long-term
relationship with stakeholders.
Nevertheless, it also has implications beyond the corporate sociopolitical activism
context. For instance, if a large acquisition is performed by a narcissistic CEO not because of
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overconfidence in their ability but because they have the intention of gaining positive attention
from the public audience, then such behavior could be framed as a case of misconduct.
Contextual factors are, therefore, critical to understanding the underlying mechanisms of
narcissistic CEOs behavior.
Limitations and Future Research
The results from our study should be interpreted while taking account of several
limitations. First, we derived our measure of CEO narcissism using archival sources. Despite
their previous validation in earlier studies, the narcissism index is an imperfect measure of CEO
narcissism, and as such, measurement error could bias our estimates downward or upward.
Future research can seek to improve on our approach by triangulating narcissism from different
source indicators – e.g., videometric, signature size, or historiometric data.
Second, our analysis was limited to one sociopolitical issue. Although this focus has
allowed us to examine the evolution of the issue and how narcissistic CEOs reacted to these
changes, future scholars should not only consider the generalizability of our findings, but also
explore differences that may arise in terms of the scope and time of other issues. For instance,
narcissistic CEOs may perceive the rewards of corporate sociopolitical activism differently due
to the time horizon of the issue.
Third, we focused our analysis on an issue consistent with what Hambrick and Wowak
(2021) defined as a vivid instance of corporate sociopolitical activism. Alternatively, in multiple
sociopolitical issues analysis, future research may want to explore if narcissistic CEOs differ in
terms of the breadth and depth of their corporate sociopolitical activism. Our theorization would
indicate, for example, that narcissistic CEOs would display breadth but not depth.
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Fourth, we analyzed a sociopolitical issue with a liberal-leaning bias for CEOs and in
which a stance against the issue was not taken by any CEOs in our sample. Scholars may seek to
examine issues with a conservative-leaning bias, or which have greater variance toward both
supportive and opposing stances.
Last, there are several potential moderators that can impact the effect of CEO narcissism
and corporate sociopolitical activism. Future research may fruitfully investigate the role of
stakeholder audiences – employees, TMT members, directors and investors, and consumers – in
eliciting engagement from narcissistic CEOs as the CEOs seek to externalize their moral
identities. Scholars may also want to investigate whether narcissistic CEOs differ in their
communication of corporate sociopolitical activism or in their engagement with repeated stances
of activism.
Conclusions
This study explores why a growing number of firms perform corporate sociopolitical
activism, in particular taking stances on polarized sociopolitical issues in contrast to the default
prescriptive strategy of staying neutral. Building on the personal psychology literature, we
develop and test a theory to explain why and when narcissistic CEOs may particularly engage in
corporate sociopolitical activism for self-aggrandizing reasons. In doing so, we offer important
contributions to the nascent literature on corporate sociopolitical activism and extend the CEO
narcissism literature in meaningful ways.
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Discussion
The goal of this dissertation was to examine how narcissistic behaviors affect firm’s
strategic actions and performance. Across the three essays, I showed that examining specific
narcissistic behaviors are critical to understand the complex ways in which narcissistic CEOs can
affect firm outcomes. In doing so, this dissertation provides important contributions to the CEO
narcissism, the upper echelon, and the corporate sociopolitical activism literature.
One major contribution of this dissertation to CEO narcissism and upper echelon theory
is to provide a fine-grained theorization of how personality traits correlate to firm performance as
well as strategic outcomes (Busenbark et al, 2016; Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017; Liu et al., 2018).
Specifically, I show that underlying mechanisms associated with CEO narcissism have
differential impact on firm performance. While some mechanisms – approach motivation, selfassuredness, and attention-seeking – are likely to have positive relationships with firm
performance, the TMT threat minimization is likely to have negative relationship with firm
performance. Therefore, narcissistic can lead to opposite outcomes because of different
behavioral strategies enacted by these individuals when pursuing their grandiose self. These
finding not only calls into question the previous literature in which the mechanisms associated
with narcissism operate to influence firm performance in the same direction but also provides a
fruitful avenue from future research.
Moreover, this dissertation contributes to CEO narcissism literature by theorizing and
showing how the multi-dimensionality of the narcissism trait matters for firm performance and
likely strategic outcomes. Scholars in personality psychology have shown that narcissist
individuals can behave differently and be associated with different life outcomes because of
differences in dimensions of their narcissism profile (e.g., high leadership/authority – low
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entitlement versus low leadership/authority – high entitlement) (Back et al., 2013; Morf et al.,
2011). By bringing together upper echelons and narcissism admiration-rivalry theory, I
explicated why narcissistic CEOs seem unrelated to firm performance. And, while I focused on
narcissism, it is likely that other personality traits such as extraversion, agreeableness, humility
also display the same complex relationship with firm performance and likely strategic outcomes.
Finally, this dissertation contributes to the nascent literature on corporate sociopolitical
activism by theorizing why and when narcissistic CEOs are more likely to engage in corporate
sociopolitical activism. Scholars have shown the positive and negative effects of such activism to
an array of stakeholders (Burbano, 2021; Chatterji & Toffel, 2019; Lacker et al., 2018). I extend
this literature by showing that narcissistic CEOs are likely to engage in corporate sociopolitical
activism with a selfishness motivation. It suggests that although narcissistic CEOs may act as
“activists” by promoting an issue before it is widely accepted, they appear to be doing so to
promote themselves. Then, it would not be surprising if future research shows that the corporate
sociopolitical activism initiated by narcissistic CEOs does not contribute to the establishment of
long-term relationships stakeholder.
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